University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
8-2014

Dispositional mindfulness and working memory in the context of
acute stress.
Lauren M. Vines
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Vines, Lauren M., "Dispositional mindfulness and working memory in the context of acute stress." (2014).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1493.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1493

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of
the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS AND WORKING MEMORY IN THE CONTEXT
OF ACUTE STRESS

By
Lauren M. Vines, M.S.
B.S., William Woods University, 2007
M.S., Eastern Kentucky University, 2010

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

August, 2014

DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS AND WORKING MEMORY IN THE CONTEXT
OF ACUTE STRESS
By
Lauren McMichael Vines
B.S., William Woods University, 2007
M.S., Eastern Kentucky University, 2010
A Dissertation Approved on

July 1, 2014

by the following Dissertation Committee

___________________________________
Paul Salmon, PhD
___________________________________
Cara Cashon, PhD
___________________________________
Marci DeCaro, PhD
___________________________________
Brent Kelly, PhD
___________________________________
Barbara Stetson, PhD
ii

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband
SFC Johnathan R. Vines, United States Army,
an impeccable warrior.

“The courage of a warrior is both required and developed in the practice of meditation. It
takes courage…to confront the fact that in every instant what we are is continually
dissolving, vanishing; that there is no place to take a stand at all. To experience the death
of the concept of self; to experience that death while we’re living takes the courage and
fearlessness of an impeccable warrior.”

Joseph Goldstein, The Experience of Insight, pages 64-65

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my faculty mentor, Dr. Paul Salmon, for his wisdom and
compassion. I would also like to thank my research assistants; Rene Bayley, Melissa
Ellsworth, Jason Landis and Joy Babik for their invaluable aid and attention to detail. I
would also like to thank my Fort Hood family for their unwavering support over the past
year; they were my sangha and refuge during the completion of a dissertation and a
deployment, neither of which could have been done alone. Last, but not least, I wish to
express my gratitude to my parents, Kevin and Catherine McMichael. They have
provided constant support and encouragement in many forms over the past four years.
The road was very long but, because of them, I was well equipped for the journey.

iv

ABSTRACT
DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS AND WORKING MEMORY IN THE CONTEXT
OF ACUTE STRESS
Lauren M. Vines
July 1, 2014
The neuropsychological domain of working memory and the nearly 3000 year-old
Buddhist construct of mindfulness appear to be disparate concepts. However, the
measurable decline of working memory capacity (WMC) under stress, in combination
with the stress-reducing and attention-focusing effects of mindfulness suggest potential
augmentation of working memory through the engagement of mindful practice. A
theoretical process through which dispositional mindfulness exerts a moderating effect on
WMC reduction following an acute stressor is proposed.
To investigate processes within this theoretical framework, a sample of undergraduate
college students (N = 67) were assessed across various measures, including level of
dispositional mindfulness, affective state, WMC, and physiological indices. Participants
were then presented with an acute emotional stressor, in the form of death and injury
images of the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2005). Following stress induction, participants were reassessed for WMC and affective
changes. Scores on affective measures underwent significant changes from pre- to poststressor in the predicted direction, while scores on a measure of WMC increased, in
v

contrast to a priori predictions. Dispositional mindfulness was not found to play a
mediational role in affective, cognitive, or physiological changes from pre- to poststressor. Implications of analyses for the present study, as well as for future research, are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Viktor Frankl, a psychiatrist and survivor of Nazi concentration camps, once
wrote that “between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to
choose our response” (2006). Frankl was eloquently referring to the human ability to
thoughtfully respond to a stimulus, rather than physiologically react in a reflexive
manner. But how exactly does one access this space? And why, in exigent moments when
a situation threatens an individual’s physical, mental, or emotional integrity, does this
space seems to shrink or appear non-existent, triggering reflexive fight, flight, or freeze
patterns of behavior rather than measured, rational responses? These questions are not
only philosophically intriguing, but have implications for understanding human behavior
in acutely stressful situations as well as individual differences which affect whether the
behavior involves a reflexive reaction or measured response. This paper addresses these
questions by exploring the relationship between two theoretically distinct yet potentially
interlinked constructs: the neuropsychological construct of working memory and the
construct of mindfulness, a facet of insight meditation described 2500 years ago in
Buddhist texts and characterized by non-judgmental, present moment awareness (Wallace
& Shapiro, 2006). A thorough review of the literature concerning these two constructs
reveals numerous studies which have begun to explore their relationship; however, the
research is primarily correlational. Additionally, the majority of such research has
examined these constructs within the context of chronic stress. For example, the work of
1

Stanley and Jha, has examined the relationship between mindfulness and working
memory in a cohort of Marines during the highly stressful, pre-deployment phase of their
training (Stanley, Schaldach, Kiyonaga, & Jha, 2011). Mindfulness as a clinical
intervention was originally developed for use in medical patients experiencing chronic
stress (Kabat-Zinn, 1990); however, recent research suggests a mindful state is equally
beneficial in the context of an acute stressor, which can quickly reduce working memory
capacity and alter cognitive functioning. In an effort to identify the space between
stimulus and response following an acutely stressful stimulus, this paper a) reviews the
extant literature concerning mindfulness and working memory; and b) proposes a novel,
theoretical process through which mindful awareness may enhance working memory
following an acute stressor.
Mindfulness
The concept of “mindfulness” has received much attention in clinical practice and
research, empirical studies and scientific inquiry over the past two decades. Originating
in Eastern philosophy and Buddhist meditation (for a detailed discussion, see Rosch,
2007), a modern definition of mindfulness denotes full and non-judgmental openness to
present-moment experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 2003) which exists in humans as a
dispositional aptitude which can be enhanced with training and maintained though
practice (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). While this definition of the construct
is generally accepted in the literature, operational definitions of mindfulness vary and
there has yet to be a consensus on one operational definition, particularly in the context of
empirical studies (Grossman, 2008; Grossman, 2011).
2

Benefits of mindfulness. As interest in mindfulness has increased, so has
evidence of its salutary effects. Suggested benefits of mindfulness for those experiencing
mental disorders, chronic health conditions, and non-clinical samples include affect
tolerance (Fulton, 2005), increased objectivity (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Leary &
Tate, 2007; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006), improved concentration
(Young, 1997), and higher levels of emotional intelligence (Walsh & Shapiro, 2006).
Additionally, mindfulness has been proposed to increase effectiveness of emotion
regulation (Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010; Farb et al., 2010). Emotion
regulation refers to the process by which aspects of an emotional experience are modified
or modulated in some form (Gross; 1998); with modifications taking place through
physiological, behavioral, and cognitive means (Bridges, Denham, & Ganiban, 2004).
This process is an integral facet of mental health and its dysregulation can cause severe
impairment in adaptive functioning, as seen by the multitude of mental disorders which
include emotion dysregulation as a primary symptom (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). The literature base concerning emotion regulation is large, and continually
growing (Koole, 2009; for a complete review of the construct, see Gross, 2007). Specific
to mindfulness, emotion regulation refers to the “capacity to remain mindfully aware at
all times, irrespective of the apparent valence or magnitude of any emotion that is
experienced” (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009, p. 569). This ability is purportedly
cultivated through the systematic training of awareness and non-reactivity to emotional
experiences during mindful practice (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009). The potential
for mindfulness to facilitate improved emotion regulation has implications for its use in
3

clinical populations since, as previously mentioned, emotion dysregulation is a symptom
of many mental disorders.
As a treatment for mental disorders, mindfulness based interventions (MBIs) have
been found to be particularly effective for individuals suffering from anxiety and
depression. For example, a meta-analysis of 39 studies in which participants received a
MBI for a variety of psychiatric and medical conditions focused specifically on
symptoms of anxiety and depression (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010). Results
indicated robust effect sizes associated with MBIs provided to subjects with anxiety and
mood disorders which were maintained over follow-up. In regards to MBIs for chronic
physical conditions, the effect of mindfulness on individuals with chronic pain has been
the subject of multiple empirical studies. A recent review of ten empirical studies of
MBIs for chronic pain found these interventions produced nonspecific effects for the
reduction of pain symptoms and pain-related depressive symptoms (Chiesa & Serretti,
2011). However, due to the small sample size and lack of randomization in the majority
of these studies, the review was unable to demonstrate MBIs to be more efficacious than
other interventions such as support and educational groups. Additionally, the effects of
MBIs focused on stress reduction have also been studied in psychologically healthy
populations. Chiesa and Serretti (2009) found in a recent meta-analysis of 10 controlled
and randomized controlled studies of MBIs provided to healthy subjects, there was a
significant, positive nonspecific effect compared to wait list controls. These results were
maintained even when the randomized controlled studies were analyzed separately.
Again, small sample sizes were a significant limitation for many of the studies, and the
4

majority of samples were composed of female, Caucasian undergraduate students, further
limiting the generalizability of results (Chiesa & Serretti, 2009). While meta-analyses of
MBIs do consistently identify limitations regarding sampling and study design, overall
results suggest significant benefits of MBIs for both clinical and non-clinical populations.
Aside from its benefits for various populations, the efficacy of mindfulness for
stress reduction has been demonstrated in multiple studies (Birnie, Garland, & Carlson,
2010; Chang, et al., 2004; Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; Shapiro, et al., 2005). Furthermore,
MBIs which have emerged over recent years are implicated in the reduction of stress for
both physical and mental disorders (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Witkiewitz & Bowen,
2010). One of the most investigated mindfulness interventions is Mindfulness–Based
Stress Reduction (MBSR), a clinical program originally developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn to
reduce stress in medically ill patients through systematic training in mindfulness
meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). The MBSR program consists of 8 to 10 group sessions,
which contain training in mindfulness techniques and education about the
psychophysiology of stress and emotions (Santorelli, 1999). Participants are asked to
engage in formal and informal meditation practices outside of the group sessions (for a
more detailed discussion, see Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Grossman and colleagues (2004)
conducted a comprehensive review of 64 studies in which MBSR and other MBIs were
used to treat stress due to chronic health conditions. Among the twenty studies which met
criteria for the final meta-analysis, medical diagnoses of participants ranged from
fibromyalgia, various forms of cancer, and coronary artery disease to various forms of
psychopathology. Additionally, several studies contained non-clinical samples. Results of
5

the meta-analysis showed consistently strong effect sizes, despite the wide variety of
samples. Grossman and colleagues suggested such results indicate mindfulness may
enhance more general processes related to coping under stress both in daily and atypical
situations. Of the studies included in the analysis, a significant limitation was the absence
of post-treatment follow-up. As a result, this meta-analysis was only able to comment on
the immediate effects of MBIs. A recent review of randomized control trials of MBSR
found that compared to control groups, MBSR treatment was more likely to reduce selfreported levels of anxiety, depression, anger, rumination, general psychological distress,
and increase positive affect, self-compassion, and overall quality of life (Keng, Smoski,
& Robins, 2011).
Proposed models of mindfulness. As the number of studies investigating the
effects of mindfulness has grown, so has interest in the proposed mechanisms through
which these effects are engendered. Multiple models exist in the extant literature, with
each model suggesting various mechanisms of change. For example, some proposed
mechanisms focus on changes in cognitive activity, such as increased awareness of
metacognitions (Teasdale et al. 2002), the ability to re-perceive (Shapiro et al. 2006), and
decreased rumination (Deyo et al. 2009; Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010).
Others suggest mediators involving attentional processes including an increased ability to
focus attention or alternatively engage in open monitoring (Lutz et al. 2008). Holzel and
colleagues (2011) have proposed a multifaceted process through which various
mechanisms of mindfulness interact to produce benefits. These mechanisms include
attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation through reappraisal and
6

exposure, and a change in self-perspective. Moreover, Holzel asserts that certain
mechanisms may play a greater role in the overall process than others on a moment by
moment basis within the mindful experience (Holzel et al., 2011). An additional model of
mindfulness has been proposed by Bishop and colleagues (2004), with two over-arching
components. In Bishop’s model, the first component involves attention regulation, which
allows the individual to maintain their focus on the immediate, present moment
experience. Bishop additionally proposes that the first component of attention regulation
contains two types of mental skills; sustained attention skills and switching skills. Skills
in sustained attention allow an individual to maintain focus on a specific present moment
experience and avoid distractions from transient thoughts, feelings, and sensations.
Alternately, switching skills refer to the ability to return to the desired point of attention
once distraction occurs (Bishop et al., 2004); for example, a practitioner of mindfulness
would demonstrate switching when he or she redirects attention from a distracting
thought back to the here-and-now experience of the breath. Attention regulation is then
followed by the second component of the model, which is an open, curious orientation
toward one’s experiences. This attitudinal component is hypothesized to lead to
reductions in experiential avoidance, increases in trait openness, and improved affect
tolerance (Bishop et al., 2004).
Critiques of mindfulness. Just as proposed mechanisms for change related to
mindfulness practice have begun to emerge, so have critiques of mindfulness and its
related field of research. Grossman (2008; 2011) has published several critiques of
mindfulness and the current assessment tools which purport to measure mindfulness. One
7

of Grossman’s recent critiques is the lack of gold-standard measures with which to assess
an individual’s level of mindfulness, despite the existence of multiple self-report
inventories (Grossman, 2011). Examples of such self-report measures frequently used in
empirical studies include the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown &
Ryan, 2003), the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, &
Allen, 2004), the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (CAMS; Feldman, Hayes,
Kumar, & Greeson, 2004; Hayes & Feldman, 2004), and the Philadelphia Mindfulness
Scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). While good internal
consistencies have been found for each of these measures (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer,
Smith, & Allen, 2004; Feldman et al., 2004; Baer et al., 2006; Cadaciotto et al., 2008),
most of these inventories have been validated solely in samples of undergraduate college
students; Grossman (2011) has identified this as a weakness in their psychometric
construction. However, Brown and colleagues have countered this criticism by
suggesting that measures such as the MAAS have been developed to measure
mindfulness as it occurs in individuals without meditation experience, justifying their use
of college samples for initial validation (Brown, Ryan, Loverich, Biegel, & West, 2011).
Additionally, Grossman notes the lack of a gold-standard measure with which to
assess an individual’s level of mindfulness, in contrast to a multitude of self-report
inventories (Grossman, 2011). Grossman asserts that without a gold-standard measure, it
is not possible to assess the construct validity the existing mindfulness questionnaires.
Developers of mindfulness questionnaires have countered that at this early stage in
mindfulness research, it may be of greater benefit to continue establishing construct
8

validity of existing mindfulness measures, rather than waiting for a gold-standard
measure to appear (Brown, Ryan, Loverich, Biegel, & West, 2011). Additionally, good
convergent validity has been found between the previously mentioned scales (Baer et al.,
2006), and criterion validity of scales such as the MAAS have been supported through
consistent associations with behavioral, physiological, and neurological outcomes
(Brown et al., 2011).
Another critique by Grossman is that current mindfulness measures may assess
qualities quite different from the original Buddhist characterization of mindfulness, and
do not take into account elements of mindfulness such as intention, tolerance, compassion
and kindness, and ethical behavior (Grossman, 2008; Grossman, 2011). An analysis of
current mindfulness literature suggests that Grossman is correct in his assertion that
empirical research of mindfulness utilizes a Western adaptation of the original Buddhist
construct. However, it is also worth noting that Buddhist literature and scholars have
never reached a complete consensus on the exact definition of the construct themselves
(Grossman, 2008).
Other critiques of research related to mindfulness research include nonrandomized samples, a heavy self-selection bias, and the difficulty of creating a doubleblind condition inherent to meditation studies (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010). Chiesa and
Serriti (2010) suggest the latter limitation might be overcome, to some extent, through the
use of a single-blind design, and note that this strategy has already been applied in some
recent studies. Additional critiques have noted a lack of attention paid to participant
qualities which might affect the apparent efficacy of the interventions. Bishop (2002) has
9

suggested preexisting personality traits may influence recruitment and compliance
particularly in MBIs, and individual differences in attention may influence the ability to
utilize mindfulness practice in a manner which alleviates stress.
Current controversies: Trait or state? As previously mentioned, a current
criticism of mindfulness is the varied operational definitions within its body of research.
Within these varied definitions, certain discrepancies exist as to the particular qualities of
this “deceptively simple concept” (Brown & Ryan, 2004, p. 242). One such discrepancy
is whether mindfulness exists as a state induced through mindful practice, or as a traitlike dispositional quality, consistent across situations. An analysis of literature
concerning this discrepancy suggests the distinction between mindfulness as a state or
trait is subtle. For example, Kabat-Zinn (2003) has suggested that the ability to be
mindful exists in all individuals to varying degrees, and that formal mindfulness practice
can increase this ability. As such, sitting meditation may create a state of mindfulness by
regulating attention in a particular way (Bishop et al., 2004). This state dissolves when
attention ceases to be regulated in this particular fashion (Bishop et al., 2004), with the
amount of mindfulness experienced during the practice dependent on the capacity for
mindfulness present in the practitioner. Thus, even though mindfulness is framed as an
experiential state, both Kabat-Zinn (2003) and Bishop (2004) additionally suggest the
existence of a necessary capacity to engage in non-judgmental, present moment focus
before the state can be experienced. Alternatively, Brown and Ryan (2003) have
suggested that, while a mindful state can be produced as a product of meditation,
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mindfulness is an innate attentional quality present in all individuals and independent
from formal mindfulness practice.
The trait concept of mindfulness described by Brown and Ryan (2003) suggests a
spectrum along which individual differences lie, with consistent mindful attention at the
high end of the spectrum and habitual, automatic thinking, at the low end (Langer, 1989).
Moreover, while Brown and Ryan concede that mindfulness is "inherently a state of
consciousness" (2003, p. 824), they and others assert that trait-like tendencies exist in
regards to the frequency with which this state of consciousness is experienced (see
Brown et al., 2007; Brown & Cordon, 2009; Brown & Ryan, 2003). For example, an
individual with a high capacity for the experience of mindfulness may not bring a nonjudgmental attitude and focused awareness to every moment, but may be likely to do so
with greater frequency than an individual with a low capacity for mindfulness.
This conceptualization of innate or dispositional mindfulness is similar to the
conceptualization of positive and negative affect by Watson, Tellegen and colleagues (see
Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), who suggested
that while positive and negative affect states can be induced in all individuals, individual
differences occur in the capacity for each form of affect, with some individuals primed to
experience greater amounts of positive or negative affect than others. Similarly, recent
research on dispositional mindfulness has demonstrated that individuals with no formal
meditation practice display varied individual differences in their responses to self-report
measures of mindful awareness (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2003;
Levesque & Brown, 2003).
11

Based on an analysis of the previously discussed literature, trait-like or
dispositional mindfulness in this manuscript will be operationally defined as an
individual’s capacity for and frequency of a non-judgmental, present-moment attentional
focus during daily life. Additionally, while there are several terms used in mindfulness
literature to describe a trait-like capacity for mindful experience, such as trait
mindfulness, everyday mindfulness, innate mindfulness and dispositional mindfulness,
this paper will utilize the latter terminology to describe individual differences in mindful
experience. Although dispositional mindfulness and trait mindfulness are both widely
used by current researchers of the construct, the term "trait" is also used to describe stable
aspects of personality; while mindfulness has been linked to certain core personality traits
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Bishop et al., 2005; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, &
Toney, 2006), this paper is primarily concerned with a general tendency toward mindful
awareness rather than personality attributes. Therefore, the innate aspect of mindfulness
which exists outside of formal practice while henceforth be referred to as dispositional
mindfulness (DM).
As previously mentioned, criticisms of mindfulness include the absence of a goldstandard measure and the subsequent inability to determine the construct validity of
mindfulness questionnaires (Grossman, 2001). This criticism extends to measures used to
determine levels of DM. Grossman (2001) has suggested that self-report trait mindfulness
questionnaires may measure qualities quite different than those present during a state of
formal meditation. This paper recognizes these limitations, and agrees with Grossman
(2001) that new self-report measures should consider specific behaviors, or even
12

physiological experiences, thought to be related to DM. While limitations exist in the
measurement of DM, they are not grounds for its dismissal as a construct, but rather
future areas of expansion for the field. Additionally, Grossman is likely correct that DM
is not synonymous with the experience of formal mindfulness practice. In fact, there is a
recent study which supports this view; Thompson and Waltz (2007) found no relationship
between DM and mindfulness induced through a brief sitting meditation in a large sample
of individuals with no previous meditation experience. However, an analysis of the
previously mentioned DM literature does provide a theoretical foundation for the
experience of mindful awareness outside of formal practice.
Operational definition of mindfulness relevant to cognitive processes. As
reviewed earlier, mindfulness research is still in an early stage and operational definitions
of the construct differ with each study. However, for the purposes of this manuscript,
mindfulness is defined as the experience of sustained, nonjudgmental attention towards
both internal and external events, based on the two component model of Bishop and
colleagues (2004). Furthermore, this particular manuscript will consider mindfulness as a
dispositional attribute, with the level of this disposition present determining the frequency
with which this particular state of consciousness is experienced (Brown et al., 2007;
Brown & Cordon, 2009; Brown & Ryan, 2003). While other models of mindfulness exist,
the simplicity of the two component model proposed by Bishop and colleagues allows for
integration with cognitive processes such as working memory. Moreover, defining
mindfulness as a dispositional attribute similarly allows for integration and comparison
with working memory, a cognitive process in which individual differences occur
13

(Illkowska & Engle, 2010). Additionally, an analysis of literature concerning models of
mindfulness suggest that multi-component processes such as the model suggested by
Holzel and colleagues (2011) may be contained within over-arching components of
attention and a nonjudgmental attitude. Lastly, the Bishop model appears to most closely
reflect the original Kabat-Zinn definition of mindfulness, “paying attention in a particular
way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4),
which is closely related to the original Buddhist construct (Grossman, 2011). The two
components of this model, attention and non-judgment, will now be examined in terms of
their relationship to cognitive processes which may sustain or enhance mental resiliency
following an acute stressor.
Attention. Outside of mindfulness research, there is a voluminous amount of
literature pertaining to the cognitive process of attention. Specific to mindfulness,
attention is described as the conscious awareness of internal and external stimuli as they
occur in the present moment, and involves a self-regulatory process through which one’s
attention is constantly redirected towards present moment experiences (Bishop et al.,
2004). An illustration of this can be found in formal mindfulness practice, during which
practitioners focus their attention on a particular stimulus, such as the breath. At any time
a practitioner finds attention has become unfocused, she or he would return the focus to
the breath. For example, instructions for mindfulness meditation often include the
following: “Focus your entire attention on your incoming and outgoing breath. Try to
sustain your attention there without distraction. If you get distracted, calmly return your
attention to the breath and start again” (Smith & Novak, 2003; p.77).
14

Once a stimulus becomes strong enough to cross the attentional threshold needed
for an individual to detect its presence, a rapid process quickly follows; the stimulus is
evaluated as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘neutral’ as a result of prior conditioning (Brown, Ryan, &
Creswell, 2007). Such rapid categorization may be influenced and aided by cognitive
schemas, previously established beliefs, and automatic labels or judgments. For example,
a physiological experience of anxiety, such as a rapid heartbeat might arise during
mindfulness meditation. Once the sensation is detected, a novice practitioner may quickly
evaluate it as “bad”, having previously been conditioned to experience this sensation as
distressing. However, the impartiality emphasized by attitudinal components of
mindfulness aid in the redirection of attention back to the present moment focus and
reduces habitual, automatic cognitive reactions (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). In this manner, a
mindful individual upon experiencing external or internal events would operate from a
position of “pure” attention, or simply “noticing”, rather than engaging in reflexive
elaboration of the experience through judgments and labels. Thus, the selective attention
of an individual engaging in mindfulness is fully focused without intrusions of
comparisons, categorizations, evaluations, or ruminative thoughts (Marks, Sobanski, &
Hine, 2010). This focused attention has been hypothesized as the process through which
long-term mindful practitioners experience cortical changes, evidenced by functional
brain imaging, and associated with greater attentional capacity than novice practitioners
or individuals with no mindfulness experience (Kilpatrick, et al., 2011; Pagnoni & Cekic,
2007; Brefczynski-Lewis, et al., 2007). While attention is a crucial component of
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mindfulness, the manner in which attention is brought to the present moment is also
important and deserves equal consideration.
Non-judgment. The idea that the quality of attention is just as important as the
act of focusing one’s attention is considered a primary foundation of mindfulness (KabatZinn, 1990). For example, an individual might focus attention on present moment
experiences but in a critical, judgmental manner (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman,
2006), or attention may be focused with qualities of openness and warm curiosity (KabatZinn, 2003); such differences are hypothesized to influence an individual’s affective and
cognitive experience of moment-by-moment sensory input (Bishop, et al., 2006). The act
of “being present” with external and internal experiences without “condemning,
criticizing, shaming, or rejecting” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 203) represents the mindful quality
of non-judgment. Similarly, non-judging may also be conceptualized as acceptance of
present-moment experiences (Bishop, et al., 2006), which provides a context for internal
events to be viewed as transient, observable experiences rather than concrete events
requiring an immediate reaction. Specifically, open acceptance provides a mechanism
through which thoughts, physical sensations, and affective responses are observed as
events, rather than experienced with the elaboration of categorical judgments (Walach et
al., 2006) or labels such “this experience is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Giluk, 2009). Such
elaboration on inner experiences reduces contact with the present moment, as it directs
the individual’s focus inward towards cognitive events and away from the experience of
the here and now (Giluk, 2009). This specific attitudinal orientation is described by
Shapiro and colleagues (2006) as a facet of a single process of mindfulness combined
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with attention and intention into a simultaneous cycle of awareness such that a mindful
state cannot occur without openness and curiosity.
The importance of a non-judgmental attitude towards present moment experiences
is particularly apparent in instances where it is excluded from the act of attention towards
inner emotional experiences. For example, individuals suffering from anxiety disorders
often present with various somatic, cognitive, and emotional symptoms triggered by a
threatening stimuli. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is one such condition, occurring
in the form of re-experiencing, hyper-arousal, and avoidant symptoms (APA, 2000), all
of which are highly distressing. Research suggests traumatized individuals who make
cognitive evaluations or judgments about these symptoms, concluding something is
wrong rather than accepting them as part of the natural pattern of healing post-trauma, are
more likely to develop PTSD than those who did not make such evaluations (Ehlers &
Clark, 2011). In contrast, Shapiro and colleagues (2006) suggest that attention coupled
with an attitude of openness and acceptance allows anxiety to be viewed as an
impermanent inner state, one that may be unpleasant but will pass with time, thus
allowing for greater tolerance of anxiety and fewer avoidant coping strategies, such as
substance use or thought suppression (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). A
non-judgmental attitudinal orientation allows inner experiences to be treated as sources of
information for enhanced decision making and self-regulation (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin,
& Freedman, 2006) rather than objects of fear, providing a mechanism by which a
thoughtful response to a stimulus is engendered, rather than a reflexive reaction.
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Both a non-judgmental attitude and focused attention play important roles in the
creation and maintenance of a mindful experience. Analysis of these two components
reveals the complementary nature of mindfulness to certain cognitive processes. For
example, focused attention on specific stimuli precedes the encoding and storage of these
stimuli into short-term memory (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007) while working in concert
with the mind’s mental sketch-board, a functional domain known as working memory.
Working memory is particularly prone to reduction in its ability to hold and protect
information against distractions when an individual is cognitively compromised, due to
either environmental stress or symptoms of mental distress (de Kloet, Joëls, & Holsboer,
2005; Joorman & Gotlib, 2008). This aspect of working memory coupled with the pure
attention resultant from a mindful state has encouraged the development of theoretical
hypotheses suggesting augmentation of working memory capacity through the
engagement of mindful practice (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Jha, Stanley, & Baime,
2010; Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010). In order to better understand the
clinical implications of this theory, a thorough investigation of the importance of working
memory to cognitive and affective functioning is warranted.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC)
Working memory capacity (WMC) has been operationally defined as the capacity
to maintain and manipulate goal-relevant information over brief periods of time by
shielding it from goal-irrelevant stimuli (Conway et al., 2005; Engle, 2002; Baddeley,
2003); WMC is “critical for surviving and thriving in complex, ever-changing, and
challenging situations” (Jha & Kiyonaga, 2010, p. 1036). WMC acts as a time and
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capacity limited construct in which information is stored and then processed; it was
initially considered to be solely involved in the storage of temporary, short-term memory
(Baddeley & Hitchm 1974). However, more recent studies suggest WMC may in fact
involve both long-term and short-term memory (Baddeley, 2003; Unsworth & Engle,
2007). Additionally, WMC operates as one of the cognitive functions by which central
executive functioning is enabled (Miyake et al., 2000), thereby making higher order
cognition possible. However, working memory is but one component of executive
functioning, which has been defined as “the dimension of human behavior that deals with
‘how’ behavior is expressed” (Lezak, 1983, as cited in Jurado & Roselli, 2007, p. 213).
According to Miyake and colleagues (2000), two other basic executive functions exist,
which are inhibition (the ability to “deliberately inhibit dominant, automatic…responses
when necessary”; Miyake et al., 2000, p. 57) and mental set shifting (the ability to shift
attention between multiple tasks). Cognitive behaviors mediated by executive functions
are those high-level abilities typically attributed to the prefrontal regions of the brain
(Stuss et al., 2002), such as verbal reasoning, problem solving, inhibition, and initiation
and monitoring of actions (Chan, Shum, Toulpoulou, & Chen, 2008). Overarching
components of executive functions include goal formation, goal-related planning,
behaviors associated with goal-directed plans, and effectual performance of those plans
(Lezak, 1983). Due to its importance in the understanding of human cognition and
behavior, a vast amount of literature covers the topic of executive functioning, much of
which is outside the scope of this manuscript (for a recent review, see Jurado & Rosselli,
2007).
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As an executive function, WMC is theorized to be a predictor of fluid
intelligence, a significant factor in the performance of an assortment of cognitive
activities (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).

WMC is also responsible for

cognitive flexibility, which is achieved by protecting behavioral goals from competing
stimuli while concurrently monitoring for goal relevant information (Miller & Cohen,
2001). The neurological mechanisms underlying WMC and cognitive flexibility are, as
previously mentioned, found within the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Mansouri, Tanaka, &
Buckely, 2009). However, studies of the PFC have indicated this brain structure to be
quite susceptible to the effects of both acute and chronic stress (Arnsten, 2007).
Moreover, WMC’s ability to protect relevant information from irrelevant or distracting
sensory input appears to suffer as a result of stress (Wegner & Erber, 1992).
It has been theorized that WMC involves a combination of both trait and state
aspects (Ilkowska & Engle, 2010), so while stressful environments may be deleterious to
WMC in all individuals (Evans & Schamberg, 2009; Vasterling et al., 2006), some may
possess higher baseline WMC in such situations. Indeed, recent research on individual
differences in WMC has demonstrated low WMC to be associated with increases in
emotionally intrusive thoughts, risk of substance abuse, and risk of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and other anxiety disorders, (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Schmeichel,
Volokhov, & Demeree, 2008), as well as greater overall psychiatric dysfunction
(Unsworth, Heitz, & Engle, 2005). Additionally, individuals with low WMC have been
found to be more likely to report mind wandering during a task requiring focused
attention (Kane et al., 2007), much as novice practitioners of mindfulness frequently
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report mind wandering during breath focused meditations (Jha et al., 2010). In contrast,
individuals high in WMC have been found to be more successful at emotion regulation
(Schmiechel & Demeree, 2010); interestingly, individuals with higher levels of trait
mindfulness have similarly displayed more adaptive emotional functioning and higher
levels of emotional intelligence than individuals low in trait mindfulness (Baer et al.,
2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003), skills which involve regulatory components such as
recognition of emotional cues effective and management of affective responses (Mayer,
Salovey, & Caruso, 2008). Indeed, a recent study found higher levels of trait mindfulness
were associated with higher trait levels of emotional intelligence as well as higher levels
of positive affect and lower levels of negative affect (Schutte & Malouff, 2011).
Self-regulatory processes in general have also been linked to working memory. In
one study, setting a self-regulatory goal of not consuming candy successfully guided
consumption in individuals with high WMC, but not those low in WMC (Hofmann, et al.,
2008). The authors of this study suggested that individuals high in WMC might be more
able to engage in goal-directed behaviors guided by self-regulatory goals. However,
much of the previously reviewed research of self-regulatory behavior, affective and
emotional functioning, and attention in the context of both mindfulness and WMC is
largely correlational in nature. Future research concerning these two cognitive processes
should investigate further into such positive associations with affect and self-regulatory
behavior, and focus on potential causal relationships between WMC and mindfulness.
Mindfulness and WMC: Compatible constructs. As previously mentioned,
commonalities between mindfulness and WMC appear in the context of their
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relationships to attention, cognitive control, and emotion regulation. Multiple recent
studies have indicated improvements in WMC following mindfulness training
(Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Jha et al., 2010; Kozhevnikov, Louchakova, Josipovic &
Motes, 2009; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & Goolkasian, 2010), and this research
has also suggested that increases in WMC may mediate the observed improvements in
affective regulation following mindfulness training. The increases seen in WMC during
studies of mindfulness training may themselves be mediated by increases in attentional
areas, as was observed through mathematical modeling in a study of mindfulness training
and working memory (van Vugt & Jha, 2011). Following a month-long mindfulness
training retreat, participants were presented with a delayed-recognition working memory
task using highly confusable face stimuli. Results demonstrated that MT participants
demonstrated faster response times and improvements in information quality and
decisional processes when compared to an age and education matched control group.
Further investigation of the relationship between mindfulness and WMC was explored in
several studies conducted by Stanley and Jha, which assessed WMC status pre- and postmindfulness training, using the Ospan task1 in a cohort of military service members (Jha
et al., 2010; Stanley & Jha, 2009). In the 2010 study, Jha, Stanley and colleagues
investigated the impact of mindfulness training (MT) on WMC and affective experience
in a cohort of Marines during the pre-deployment period. It was hypothesized that the

1

The Ospan requires participants to solve a series of math problems while trying to remember a sequence of unrelated
letters, ranging from three to seven letters in length. The Ospan score, which is the most commonly used index of
WMC (see Conway et al., 2005), is the sum of all recalled letters from letter sets that were recalled completely in the
correct order. Full details of task structure and timing can be found in Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, et al. (2005).
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MT would mitigate the effects of long term stress typically experienced during the predeployment period by increasing WMC in the service members and decreasing negative
affect. The cohort was divided into two groups, both of which were exclusively male
service members. The control group contained 17 participants and the group who
received mindfulness training contained 31 individuals who participated in an 8 week MT
course, as well as logging MT practice hours outside of the structured course time. Of the
31 Marines who underwent MT, two were excluded from the final analysis due to failure
to follow participation guidelines. A third group of civilians not undergoing the
prolonged stressor of pre-deployment was also provided the MT. In regards to results,
WMC remained stable throughout the study in the civilian group, and it was found to
decrease in the military control group. In the MT group, those with greater amounts of
MT practice time demonstrated increased WMC, while participants with low practice
times experienced similar decreases in WMC to the control group. These results are
suggestive of a dose-response effect. Moreover, those with greater practice times were
also found to report lower levels of negative affect, measured by the PANAS, as well as
higher levels of positive affect. The relationship between practice time and negative, but
not positive, affect was found to be mediated by WMC. Interestingly, previous research
found the presence of negative affect to mediate working memory performance
(Linnenbrink, Ryan, & Pintrich, 1999). These results indicate that sufficient amounts of
MT practice may provide a protective effect against impairments in WMC associated
with high-stress environments. However, the implications of this study are limited to an
environment of chronic stress, and cannot be generalized to the impact of an acute
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stressor on WMC. Other studies, although not specifically examining the link between
mindfulness and WMC, have alluded to WMC’s relationship with cognitive activities
purported to be contained within the construct of mindfulness. For example, Barrett and
colleagues (2004) suggested that individuals high in WMC are more skilled in controlled,
goal-directed cognitive processing in the face of distractions. This trend appears to reflect
the focused attention component of mindfulness frequently used in factor analyses of
mindfulness scales (Davis, Lau, & Cairns, 2009; Feldman et al., 2007; Brown & Ryan,
2003). Additionally, a series of studies by Schmeichel and colleagues (2008) found that
individuals high in WMC were better able than those with low WMC to adopt an
unemotional attitude while viewing emotionally charged stimuli. These results are
reminiscent of the nonjudgmental awareness component of mindfulness as well as Lau
and colleagues’ mindful construct of decentering (the ability to not personally identify
with internal, emotional content; Lau et al., 2006).
Neuroimaging support. In addition to the previously mentioned empirical
studies, which have begun to delineate commonalities between WMC and mindfulness,
recent research utilizing neuroimaging techniques further elucidate potential common
structural underpinnings relevant to WMC and mindfulness, such as the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). A multitude of neurophysiological studies of monkeys
(Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Fuster &
Alexander, 1971; Miller, et al., 1996; Quintana & Fuster, 1999) and more recent fMRI
studies of humans (Courtney et al., 1998; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Zarahn et al. 1999;
Sakai et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2002; Jha & McCarthy, 2000) have identified the DLPFC
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as a brain structure critical to WMC. Additionally, several human fMRI studies have also
demonstrated that reduction in activity of the DLPFC leads to WMC performance
reduction (Funahashi et al., 1993; Pessoa et al., 2002; Sakai et al., 2002). Although there
are relatively few neuroimaging studies specifically examining the neural correlates of
mindfulness, those that exist identify brain structures associated with DM and a state of
mindfulness, particularly the DLPFC. For example, Creswell and colleagues (2007)
reported an association between DM, as measured by the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003),
and enhanced DLPFC and decreased amygdala response during an affect-labeling task
presented concurrently with fMRI scanning; specifically, the task involved matching
facial expressions to appropriate affect words. Moreover, DM was associated with
increased overall PFC activation affect labeling, compared with a gender labeling control
task. The authors also found activity in the PFC during affect labeling to be negatively
associated in participants high in DM but not in low DM participants. In a similar study
of 18 healthy individuals, Modinos, Ormel, and Aleman (2009) found that DM, as
measured by the KIMS (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) was positively associated with
increased DLPFC activation during instructed reappraisal of negatively valenced
photographs, viewed while participants underwent fMRI scanning. Both Modinos and
Creswell’s investigations utilized only one measure of DM. These studies may have
contributed more to the understanding of brain structures related to mindfulness by
including several measures in their assessment of DM.
While not assessing DM, a neuroimaging study of mindfulness practitioners
found the amount of time spent engaging in formal mindfulness practices to be associated
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with significant changes in brain structures (Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman, Gay, et al., 2005).
Specifically, those participants with extensive meditation experience showed increased
cortical thickness in Brodmann’s Area (BA) 9, an area of the brain which contributes to
the DLPFC, in comparison to novice practitioners and non-practitioners. Interestingly,
this increase in cortical thickness appeared to be resilient to the effects of aging, as
experienced middle-aged practitioners displayed similar cortical thickness typically seen
in individuals in their twenties and thirties. These results indicate time spent in a mindful
state may activate BA 9, a region previously identified as an important cortical site for
the voluntary regulation of negative emotion (Levesque et al., 2003) and the regulation of
stressful input (Liberzon et al., 2007). Furthermore, analysis of these results suggests a
structural correlate to mindfulness’ positive associations with emotion regulation (Baer et
al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003). Indeed, due to its anatomical connections to lateral
columns of the periaquaductal grey, a structure which encircles the mesenphalic aquaduct
(Linnman et al., 2012) and association with active emotional coping styles (Keay &
Bandler, 2001), BA 9 has been suggested to serve as an integrative site which regulates
affective states and active coping behavior during times of stress. While the results of the
Lazar (2005) study reinforce the connection between mindfulness and the DLPFC, the
authors did not assess for DM and were primarily concerned with formal mindfulness
practice. This may limit the generalizability of the results in regards to neural correlates
of DM. However, they do replicate findings similar to previously mentioned
neuroimaging studies implicating the DLPFC’s relationship with DM, in addition to its
previously supported role in the functioning of WMC.
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Acute Stress
While the link between stress and memory has been a topic of frequent research
(for a review, see Lupien, Maheu, Fiocco, & Schramek, 2007), fewer studies have
considered the effect on acute stress on specific cognitive domains, such as WMC.
Indeed, specific focus on a particular domain of cognitive function is crucial, as stress
may actually impart unique effects on different domains (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2009).
Acute stress, specifically, refers to situations which involve novel problems, time
pressure, and high levels of ambiguity, or scenarios in which survival is at risk (Salas,
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996). Typically, the experience of acute stress results in a cascade
of physiological responses primarily originating in the activation of two biological
systems, the sympathetic adrenal medulla (SAM) axis and the hypothalamic pituitary
(HPA) adrenal axis (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011). In the event of acute
stress, the SAM axis responds with the release of neurotransmitters including epinephrine
and norepinephrine, which subsequently influence heart rate and blood pressure, while
the HPA axis releases cortisol (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011). The time
frame of the acute stress response is important in understanding the neurobiology of acute
stress. Previous research suggests that following a moderately acute stressor, it may take
several minutes for heart rate to return to baseline, as well as approximately one to two
hours for cortisol levels to return to the baseline (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer,
1995).
Effects of acute stress on WMC. At a moderate level, an acute stressor may
result in improved performance; however, multiple studies have consistently
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demonstrated high levels of stress can have negative effects on both physical and mental
health (McEwen, 1998; Schneiderman, Ironson, & Siegel, 2005; Selye, 1955). As
previously mentioned, stress has been shown to have particularly deleterious effects on
WMC. For example, a recent study by Duncko, Johnson, Merikangas, and Grillon (2009)
examined working memory performance during an item recognition task after randomly
assigned subjects had been exposed to a cold pressor stress test, an acute adrenergic
stressor which involves insertion of the subject’s dominant hand into ice water for 60
seconds. Subjects in the control group inserted their dominant hand in room temperature
water. Following a twenty minute delay, working memory performance was tested with
an item recognition task. Physiological changes were assessed by measuring heart rate
and salivary cortisol before, during, and after the stress procedure was administered.
Through these measures, Duncko and colleagues found that stress exposure was
associated with significantly shorter reaction times during recognition trials which
required greater amounts of information to be processed simultaneously. Moreover,
individuals exposed to the stressor were more likely to display higher false alarm rates
than those in the control group. These results suggested a paradoxical effect of exposure
to the cold pressor test, with indication of both enhanced and impaired performance on
working memory tasks. In their discussion of these results, the authors suggested that this
cognitive pattern might in fact be representative of a form of information processing
utilized in threatening situations, which is more efficient in its discrimination of stimuli
as to be beneficial in a scenario where rapid cognitive action might engender greater
chance of survival.
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A second study of WMC under stress employed an acute, social stressor, the Trier
Social Stress Test2 (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993), on subjects randomly assigned to a
stress group (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2009). Control group participants and the stress
group, following stress induction, were then asked to perform on a task of working
memory, and salivary cortisol levels were sampled throughout the experiment to measure
physiological stress effects. Results of this study indicated a prominent working memory
deficit in those subjects exposed to the stressor. As with Dunko and colleagues, Luethi,
Meier and Sandi suggested that their observations regarding the effect of stress on
working memory indicated an adaptive, streamlined mode of processing initiated in
potentially threatening situations, potentially mediated by the release of cortisol.
However, they also noted that should this type of processing be employed continually, it
might lead to the development or maintenance of disorders such as depression or PTSD.
This claim is supported by neurophysiological research which suggests chronic stress
may remodel neural pathways due to sustained activation of the HPA axis (Magarinos,
McEwen, Flugge, & Fuchs, 1996; Vyas, Mitra, Shankaranarayana Rao, & Chattarhi,
2002). Unfortunately, Luethi and colleagues’ sample consisted solely of men, limiting
generalization of results to both genders. The effects of acute stressors on specific brain
regions implicated in WMC have also been investigated. A study by Qin and colleagues

2

The TSST is a motivated performance task which combines elements of uncontrollability and high levels of socialevaluative threat (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The task consists of a brief preparation period (3 minutes) followed by a
test period. During the test period, the subject must deliver a free speech (5 minutes) and perform mental arithmetic (5
minutes) in front of an audience (for a detailed description of TSST procedures and a review of relevant research, see
Kudielka, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2007).
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(2009) found that acute stress significantly reduced activity in the DLPFC, which is
functionally related to working memory. Psychological stress was induced in healthy
volunteers through presentation of movie clips containing violent content during
simultaneous fMRI scans. During presentation, participants were asked to imagine
themselves in the scene as an eyewitness in order to achieve maximum emotional
involvement. While still undergoing fMRI scanning, participants completed the N-Back
test3 (Kirchner, 1958) of WMC. As previously mentioned, study results demonstrated
reduced activity in the DLPFC following stressor presentation and during the working
memory task. FMRI scans also indicated a reallocation of cerebral blood flow away from
functional regions associated with higher order processes, or executive functioning, in
combination with less deactivation in functional areas associated with the default mode
network (DMN). The DMN is a system of cortical structures responsible for the brain’s
resting state, which is activated in the absence of stimulus-dependent thought and is
associated with mind wandering (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Mason et al., 2007).
Moreover, activation of the DMN appears to reduce processing of sensory awareness,
thus protecting attention absorbed by internal stimuli (Barron, Riby, Greer, &
Smallwood, 2011). In regards to these findings, results of the Qin study (2009) suggest
that tasks involving WMC in the context of acute psychological stress may represent dual
processing of both external and internal stimuli. Moreover, the stress-induced
3

The N-Back task is a frequently used measure in studies of WMC. Participants are presented with a stream of stimuli
and are asked to decide for each stimulus whether it matches the one presented N items before (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl,
Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Studies have shown that processing load can be varied systematically by manipulating the
value of N, which is reflected in changes in accuracy and reaction time (see, e.g., Jonides et al., 1997 for more detail).
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deactivation of the DLPFC, through the release of large amounts of dopamine and
norepinephrine into the PFC (Zigmond, Finlay, & Sved, 1995) in conjunction with
reciprocal allocation of activity to the DMN, appears to be linked to task-irrelevant
thought intrusions. As previously mentioned, the inability to screen task-irrelevant
cognitions has been linked to lowered levels of WMC.
Previous research suggests that this biological response to acute stress is
representative of a survival mode of cognition, in which slower higher-order cognitive
processes are deactivated in order to allocate more resources to faster, reflexive types of
cognition (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Diamond et al., 2007), such as those related
to “fight-or-flight” mechanisms (Cannon, 1929). Similar studies of working memory
performance under acute stress have also indicated a change in cognitive processing
biased towards speed. As previously mentioned, Dunkco and colleagues (2009) found
higher false positive rates on a recognition task in individuals who had been previously
subjected to a cold pressor stress test, while Luethi and colleagues (2009) similarly
demonstrated a more streamlined mode of cognitive processing resulting in working
memory deficit following an induced social stressor.
In addition to the cognitive costs of physiological reactions to acute stress, the
deactivation of prefrontal brain structures in the presence of acute stress induced in
laboratory settings, such as in the Qin study, is remarkably similar to the decreased
activity of frontal regions symptomatic of individuals with various psychological
dysfunctions associated with working memory deficits (Qin et al., 2009). Previous studies
have demonstrated results suggesting that the hypofrontality observed in psychological
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disorders such as ADHD, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress
disorder, may be associated with the heightened levels of stress reported by individuals
with these conditions (Arnsten, 2007; Arnsten & Li, 2005).
In summary, acute stress has been demonstrated in laboratory studies to have
deleterious effects on WMC. However, the studies concerning acute stress and WMC
present a wide array of methods with which acute stress is induced. While the variability
in the type of stressor utilized presents a limitation in regard to the ability to synthesize
the collective results, analysis of the results themselves indicate several areas of
congruence. For example, both performance measures of WMC and functional
measurement of brain structures implicated in WMC indicate reduced functioning
following the presentation of an acute stressor. Additionally, collective results suggest
that the presence of an acute stressor may create a survival mode of cognition, in which
higher-order processes are disabled in favor of more reflexive forms of cognition.
However, the presence of mindful awareness may reduce the loss of frontal functioning,
as suggested in the following review of literature concerning mindfulness and acute
stress.
Acute stress and mindfulness. Research concerning mindfulness and stress is
most often focused on stress-reduction outcomes, with mindfulness introduced as an
independent variable acting on individuals faced with chronic stress, such as chronic
medical conditions, care-giving roles, or stressful occupations (Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, &
Cordova, 2005; Minor, et al., 2006; Birnie, Garland, & Carlson, 2010). However,
mindfulness is much less frequently studied as a mediator of acute stress induced in
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research participants. Though not directly assessing mindfulness, Gohm, Baumann, and
Sniezek (2001) conducted a complementary study of affective reactions and cognitive
performance in a sample of firemen during a live fire training exercise. The study
examined variables such as attention and clarity, which was defined as “the extent to
which individuals are able to distinguish and identify which specific emotion they are
experiencing in the moment” (Gohmm, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2001, pp. 390). While not
defined as mindfulness, this description certainly echoes mindfulness tenets such as
present moment awareness and receptivity of inner experiences. Previous research
demonstrated the activation of the SAM axis following an acute stressor can induce a
prolonged negative affect state, and a subsequent loss of cognitive flexibility (Sinha,
Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011). Gohm and
colleagues hypothesized subjects with higher levels of clarity would spend less time
attending to an emotional response to a stressful event once that emotion has been
identified, and therefore better allocate cognitive resources to the task at hand.
Essentially, these individuals would spend less time engaged in ruminative reactions to
emotions evoked by the acute stressor and perform better than those who struggled with
emotional reactions. This hypothesis was supported as firefighters who reported easily
identifying emotions during the live fire exercise also reported fewer instances of
cognitive difficulties. Their counterparts with low clarity of emotional experience
reported greater incidence of cognitive failures, such as their mind going blank.
In a mindfulness study featuring acute stress induction, Barnes and colleagues
(2007) assessed the effect of DM, as measured by the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) on
33

emotional, cognitive, and behavioral stress responses to conflict in romantic dyads. In
order to induce relationship stress, the experimenters utilized a technique developed by
Gottman (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Levenson & Gottman, 1983) to
create relational conflict in couples. Specifically, couples were asked to discuss areas of
conflict in their relationship first in person and then over an intercom, with their
interactions both observed and recorded, and later coded for discrete examples of stress
responses. Results suggested that individuals in the study with high scores on a measure
of DM experienced a less severe emotional reaction during the induced relational
stressor, as well as significantly lower levels of anxiety and anger following the period of
conflict than those with lower levels of DM.
One other study featuring the induction of acute stress in concert with measures of
mindfulness was undertaken by Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan (2009), who investigated
the effects of DM on stress perception. Participants were first assessed for baseline levels
of stress, anxiety, and DM; DM was assessed using the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Following assessment, participants completed a stress induction task during which they
were required to perform mental arithmetic under observation with performances timed
and recorded. This stress induction task was adapted from a previously verified method
of stress induction developed by Cheng (2003). After a thirty minute delay, participants’
ability to complete mazes (an activity incorporating both creative thinking and
concentration) was assessed. Study results indicated that individuals with higher scores
on a measure of dispositional mindfulness perceived less stress throughout the
experiment, as well as less utilization of avoidant coping methods than those with lower
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dispositional mindfulness scores. These individuals with high DM were also observed to
perform with higher capabilities on the maze tasks which followed the post-stress
induction delay.
A recent study of the influence of acute stress on spatial task performance
indicates similar interference by emotional experiences as found by Weinstein and
colleagues (2009). Richardson and Vanderkaay Tomasulo (2011) found that participants
who were presented with an acute stressor performed with slower response times in two
novel spatial tasks than those participants in the control group. Participants in the stressed
group also reported a prolonged negative affect state following the stressor, including
higher levels of anger, frustration, and irritability. The authors of the study suggested that
heightened negative affect may have interfered with processing speed during the spatial
tasks, indicating a reallocation of cognitive resources away from the tasks as a result of
distressing, internal experiences.
To summarize, the activation of the SAM axis in response to an acute stressor has
been implicated in the generation of a protracted experience of negative affect; it would
appear that the associated emotional response to acute stress creates additional cognitive
demand on an already taxed system, leading to changes in the processing of information.
However, the perspective through which this emotional response is viewed may influence
the degree to which it represents an additional cognitive demand, lessening the need for
reallocation of cognitive resources towards inner events such as rumination.
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Proposed Theoretical Framework
A review of the literature concerning mindfulness and WMC in the context of
acute stress suggests multiple areas of overlapping processes related to emotional
reactivity and higher order cognitive functioning. However, due to only relatively recent
interest in neuropsychological attributes of mindful processes, there is an obvious dearth
of research investigating causal relationships between WMC and mindfulness in the
context of acute stress. The following theoretical model, illustrated in Figure 1, is
proposed as a potential process through which the complementary mechanisms of
mindfulness and WMC may interact after the presentation of an acute stressor.
This conceptual model borrows its basic structure from the transactional model of
stress originally developed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984), while also integrating the
construct of mindfulness. Moreover, this model is novel in its approach of considering a
mindful appraisal process within the context of acute stress and its effects on working
memory. The transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) was chosen as a
format for the current model as the transactional model and mindfulness have previously
been integrated successfully. Notably, Kabat-Zinn (1990) incorporated the transactional
stress model with mindfulness during the development of the MBSR program.
The transactional model is based in Lazarus’ original cognitive stress theory,
which assumes cognitive appraisal processes to be important mediators of the stress
process (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Appraisal refers to the cognitive
process by which stressful events are evaluated in reference to one's well-being (Lazarus,
2000; Lazarus, 2001). The way in which an event is appraised by an individual has been
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shown to mediate the stressfulness of said event, and appears to aid in the regulation of
the quality and intensity of emotional response to the situation (Steptoe & Vogele, 1986).
In the transactional stress model, Lazarus proposed the existence of two forms of
appraisal. During the primary appraisal, an individual evaluates whether the situation
presents a threat to one's well-being, while the secondary appraisal involves the
individual’s evaluation of coping options and their effectiveness relative to the threat.
According to the transactional model, a stress response occurs when the primary
appraisal indicates a threat and the secondary appraisal indicates the individual’s coping
options are inadequate in the face of this threat. The transactional model has largely been
empirically supported in a variety of areas (Quine & Pahl, 1991; Maier et al., 2003;
Tomaka et al., 1993), although there is limited support for the model with regards to
cortisol levels as a marker of stress response (Gaab et al., 2005; Denson et al., 2009).
As previously mentioned, Kabat-Zinn’s (1990) development of the MBSR
program represents an earlier successful integration of mindfulness and the transactional
model. Specifically, Kabat-Zinn proposed mindfulness to be of importance during the
appraisal stage of the transactional stress model, during which the individual determines
whether or not a specific circumstance is indeed a stressor. At this stage, the presentmoment awareness fostered during a mindful state allows for an objective, accurate
appraisal of the event, which allows for effective responding rather than habitual,
physiological reactivity (Ulmer, Stetson, & Salmon, 2010). This model has subsequently
received empirical support (Shapiro et al., 2006). However, Kabat-Zinn’s proposed
model and its consequent application through the MBSR program were primarily
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concerned with the appraisal of stress resultant from prolonged conditions, such as
chronic pain or chronic medical illness. As previously established, chronic stress is
qualitatively different from acute stress, both experientially and in terms of physiological
response. Additionally, the gap in research literature concerning how mindfulness and
working memory interact during acute stress to preserve cognitive functioning has also
been previously established. The proposed model is an attempt to fill this gap, and its
components are discussed in detail in the following sections.

Figure 1. Theoretical illustration of relationship between DM and WMC following an
acute stressor.
Primary threat appraisal. Prior to the first appraisal stage, an event occurs in
the external environment which is detected by the individual; this event is termed the
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potential acute stressor, as its actual threat value has yet to be determined. This
determination follows during primary stage of appraisal, as in the primary appraisal of
Lazarus and Folkman’s model, during which the individual evaluates whether or not the
event represents a threat to survival or well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Aspects
which might lead to an event being interpreted as acutely stressful include novel
problems, time pressure, and immediate threats to emotional or physical integrity (Salas,
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996). If, at this point, the event is not judged to be an acute stressor,
the individual then exits the acute stress appraisal process. However, should elements of
the event be appraised as indicative of an acute stressor, a rapid cascade of physiological
responses begins. The SAM and HPA axes respond with the release of neurotransmitters
and stress hormones (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011), which ready the body
for survival. Common effects of this physiological response include increased heart rate
and blood pressure, and accelerated breathing. These physiological reactions resulting
from identification and appraisal of an acute stressor become additional information to be
appraised as part of this process.
Secondary threat appraisal. The current model differs from the transactional
stress model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) in its approach to the secondary appraisal stage.
The secondary stage of Lazarus and Folkman’s model entails an appraisal of coping
resources; however, it is suggested that in the context of an acute, potentially lifethreatening stressor, there may not be enough time to methodically analyze resources
available to the individual or to engage in coping methods such as seeking social support
or escape-avoidance through sleep or immersion (Folkman & Lazarus, 1984). Instead,
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individuals may be more likely to appraise their own internal experience of the stressor to
determine their ability to manage the stressor effectively. While information evaluated in
the primary threat appraisal stage is largely environmental in nature, the secondary threat
appraisal phase exists as an immediate evaluation of internal sensory information, such as
the previously mentioned sequelae of the SAM and HPA activation. It is during this
appraisal of internal sensory experiences that an individual’s level of DM is proposed to
create a moderating effect. Individuals with a high level of DM are predicted to attend to
internal physiological input without evaluation or judgment (Ehlers & Clark, 2011).
Additionally, they are likely to experience low reactivity to intrusive thoughts and any
negative affect created by HPA axis activation (Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, &
Goschke, 2011; Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992). Moreover, results of the secondary
threat appraisal would be akin to an objective awareness of these inner experiences,
without application of “good” or “bad” labels, and maintained present moment focus
(Giluk, 2009). As a result, secondary stress due to interpretations of physiological
reactions as additional sources of threat does not occur (Shapiro et al., 2006), and
attention may be consistently redirected towards present moment experiences rather than
absorbed by inner experiences (Bishop et al, 2004).
In contrast, an individual with low levels of DM would be expected to appraise
internal stimuli quite differently. Such individuals are predicted to react to the
physiological sequelae of acute physiological activation without the support of a neutral,
objective perspective. Instead, low DM individuals would produce cognitive evaluations
of internal stimuli, elaborating on physiological reactions to the acute stressor with labels
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(“this experience is bad”; Giluk, 2009), or interpreting such reactions, intrusive
cognitions, or distressing affect as additional sources of fear or stress (Shapiro et al.,
2006). These experiences are appraised as negative, troubling, or indicative of an
inability to manage the stressor effectively (Ehlers & Clark, 2011). Low levels of
mindfulness at this stage also lead to greater attentional resources directed away from the
present moment, and towards intrusive thoughts or other distressing internal experiences,
or the presence of HPA-induced negative affect (Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, &
Goschke, 2011; Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992). Following the secondary threat
appraisal stage, individuals low in DM have twice evaluated their situation as
threatening: external stimuli resulted in the positive appraisal of an acute stressor, while
the secondary appraisal found internal stimuli to be additional sources of acute stress.
Neurologically, the result of these two appraisals is reduced activity in the DLPFC
(Creswell, et al., 2007; Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2009), and attention is absorbed by
non-present moment, internal stimuli such as ruminations, cognitive evaluations, and
judgments. Ultimately, the secondary appraisal stage for low DM individuals has resulted
in the evaluation of inner experiences as additional, acute stressors in and of themselves,
increasing to the point at which cognitive load compromises the mind’s ability to shield
itself from irrelevant stimuli (Baddeley, 2003; Engle, 2002; Evans & Schamberg, 2009).
Effect on WMC and subsequent behavioral action. Results of the secondary
appraisal stage, moderated by the level of DM present in the individual, directly influence
the subsequent impact on WMC. While WMC may decline to some degree in the context
of any stressor (Evans & Schamberg, 2009; Vasterling, et al., 2006), it is proposed that
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high DM individuals are able to avoid significant WMC degradation following an acute
stressor due to an objective stance towards inner experiences during the secondary
appraisal. Because of their ability to maintain a present moment focus, individuals with
high DM support maintenance of relevant information by shielding it from potentially
attention-absorbing inner stimuli, such as cognitive or physiological events (Marks,
Sobanski, & Hine, 2010). This ability mirrors the function of WMC (Baddeley et al.,
2003; Conway et al., 2005; Engle et al., 2002), producing the experience of maintained or
non-significantly decreased WMC following presentation of an acute stressor. It is
predicted that for this type of individual, the behavioral action taken will be that of a
measured response to the stressor as a result of mindfulness-enhanced self-regulation
supporting decision making (Shapiro et al., 2006). In the case of a low DM individual
following presentation of the same stressor, significant decrease in WMC is unavoidable.
As previously mentioned, both primary and secondary appraisals have resulted in the
identification of both external and internal sources of stress, attentional resources have
been directed away from the present moment and towards internal experiences
(Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011), and activity in the DLPFC, the brain
structure critical to WMC functioning (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Jha & McCarthy,
2000; Leung et al., 2002), has been reduced (Creswell et al., 2007; Modinos, Ormel, &
Aleman, 2009). It is predicted that for a low DM individual, the behavioral action which
follows the acute stressor and both appraisal stages will be that of a reflexive reaction. As
previously mentioned, numerous empirical studies suggest impaired WMC to be
associated with shorter reaction times, higher false positive rates, as well as cognitive
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processes biased towards speed rather than accuracy (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998;
Diamond et al., 2007; Dunkco et al., 2009).
Focus of Current Study
Study rationale. The importance of this theoretical illustration of the potential
moderating effect of DM upon WMC following an acute stressor lies in its implications
for future clinical interventions for individuals likely to encounter acute stressors as an
occupational hazard. Mindfulness exists to some degree as an innate aptitude in all
individuals, and can be enhanced with training and maintained though practice (Brown &
Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Therefore, mindfulness training interventions might be
developed for individuals such as emergency service personnel, law enforcement, and
military service members to enhance already present levels of DM and the likelihood of
WMC maintenance following an encounter with an acute stressor. While the previously
described survival mode of cognition engendered through an acute stress-induced
decrease in WMC (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Diamond et al., 2007; Duncko et
al., 2009; Luethi et al., 2009) certainly has merit in situations requiring rapid reflexive
action, it may also come at the cost of higher-order decision making required for acutely
stressful circumstances with high levels of ambiguity. Such situations are frequently
encountered by military personnel. Service members on the modern day battlefield
contend with acutely stressful events under ambiguous circumstances (Searcey, 2005),
which often require responses rather than reactions. For example, troops manning check
points only have a few moments to decide if a speeding car is a civilian vehicle or a
suicide bomber (Ramirez, 2005), with their decisions determining whether the vehicle is
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fired upon or allowed to approach the check point. Additionally, modern warfighters
must exhibit a high level of situational awareness, effectively filtering distracting
information and selectively attending to crucial input (Morelli & Burton, 2009).
Examples of this might include scanning a crowded marketplace to discern the presence
of combatants, or analyzing input from multiple visual monitors and grounding
subsequent tactical recommendations on such data (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994; Morelli &
Burton, 2009), all while subjected to acute stressors such as gunfire or explosions. In
such situations, the heightened false-positive response rate associated with the reduction
of WMC observed in Duncko and colleague’s (2009) laboratory translates to unintended
civilian casualties. However, amplified levels of mindfulness during the secondary threat
appraisal stage of such moments might reduce the risk of reflexive reactions, effectively
supporting WMC, maintaining higher-order thought processes, and lifting the fog of war.
Current study.
This study was undertaken to test the moderating effect of DM on WMC, stressinduced negative affect, and physiological arousal. A laboratory, emotionally charged
stressor was utilized to induce acute stress and associated negative affect. While there are
many other types of stress induction tasks in the extant literature, this type of stressor was
chosen in an effort to duplicate the emotional and cognitive effects of acute stress. While
the need to work within a laboratory setting and without causing actual psychological
harm to participants means that laboratory stressors are not fully representative of a real
world acute stressor, this emotionally charged paradigm was most analogous to situations
that might create an acute stress reaction, such as exposure to interpersonal violence or
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military combat. Moreover, using this analogue of interpersonal violence or combat
exposure allows results of the current study to have greater generalization to traumaexposed populations.
This study endeavored to take the next step in understanding the relationship
between WMC and DM in the context of an acute stressor. As an initial study of this
relationship within the specific context of acute stress, a non-clinical population of
college undergraduate students served as participants in a laboratory-based stress
induction study. Based on the reviewed literature and the previously discussed proposed
model of DM and WMC interaction, it was hypothesized participants’ level of DM will
be negatively associated with WMC loss following the stressor. Further, it is also
hypothesized that level of DM will be negatively associated with amount of negative
affect (NA) reported following the stress induction. Additionally, a contrasting pattern of
physiological response to the acute stressor was expected. Specifically, it was
hypothesized that individuals with low DM would display greater physiological reactivity
during stressor presentation than those with high DM.
Hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. It was hypothesized that working memory capacity (WMC) scores
would decrease from pre- to post-stressor, and would be moderated by dispositional
mindfulness (DM). An interaction was also predicted, such that the low DM group would
display a significant decrease in WMC while the high DM group would not display a
significant decrease in WMC following the presentation of the stressor.
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Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that negative affect (NA) scores would
decrease from pre- to post-stressor, and would be moderated by dispositional mindfulness
(DM). Specifically, it was predicted that the high DM group would not display a
significant increase in NA and that the low DM group would display a significant
increase in NA following presentation of the stressor.
Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesized that greater physiological reactivity during
stressor presentation, measured by heart rate (HR), would be observed in the low DM
group than in the high DM group. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the low DM
group will display higher overall HR during the stressor presentation than the high DM
group.
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CHAPTER 2 METHODS
Participants
Recruitment. Study participants included undergraduates recruited through the
psychology department subject pool. The study description is included in Appendix A.
Undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses are eligible to sign up for various,
university sponsored research studies, and receive course credit for their participation.
Inclusion criteria consisted of age (18 and over), written and spoken English language
comprehension sufficient for understanding directions and completing self-report
questionnaires, and normal or corrected to normal vision. As the intent of the study was
to examine the effects of dispositional mindfulness in a formal meditation-naïve
population, exclusion criteria included ongoing formal meditation practice or prior
enrollment in an MBSR program. In addition, participants were recruited and data was
collected throughout the academic year, including the spring, summer, and fall semesters.
This wide temporal window of data collection allowed sampling of students to take place
at times of both high and low academic stress, which may have resulted from
environmental factors (i.e. the start of a new school year or final examinations).
Data Collection. Participants reported individually to the Biobehavioral Research
Laboratory, where data collection was conducted by the study coordinator and/or
research assistants. The study coordinator conducted approximately one fourth of the
total data collection, and research assistants collected the remaining data; this ensured a
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minimum amount of any experimenter bias which may have affected data collection and
subsequent results. Moreover, both a male and female research assistant collected data,
ensuring less risk of participant bias related to the gender of the administrator. To ensure
a consistent experience across all participants, a standardized protocol was used (see
Appendix B).
Measures
To examine the proposed model of mindfulness and working memory within the
context of an acute stressor, this study employed measures of mindfulness, working
memory capacity, and affect. A measure of perceived, global stress was also utilized, and
questionnaires related to traumatic stress, and phobic reactivity to blood and injury were
employed as screening measures. Demographic variables used in the analyses included
age, gender and education level (year in college). Samples of all assessment measures are
found in Appendix C.
Mindfulness.
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). The MAAS (Brown & Ryan,
2003) is a 15-item single-dimension scale of trait mindfulness. The MAAS is widely used
as a measure of mindfulness, and has a longstanding record of reliability, validity and
psychometric consistency across various cultures (Christopher et al., 2009; Cordon &
Finney, 2008; Hansen, Lundh, Homman, & Wangby-Lundh, 2009; MacKillop &
Anderson, 2007; Thompson & Waltz, 2007; Van Dam, Earleywine, & Borders, 2010;
Zvolensky et al., 2006). It was developed to measure the frequency of open attention to
and awareness of experiential events occurring throughout day-to-day consciousness.
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Response options range from 1 (almost never) to 6 (almost always) on a Likert-type
scale, and items are reverse scored with higher mean scores reflecting a greater degree of
trait mindfulness. Sample MAAS items include “I rush through activities without being
really attentive to them” and “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the
present.” The MAAS shows good internal consistency across a wide range of samples,
with alphas ranging from .80–.87 (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Moreover, test–retest reliability
data over a one month period suggest MAAS scores are stable, with no significant
differences observed between first and second administration (Brown & Ryan, 2003), and
criterion validity has been supported through consistent associations with behavioral,
physiological, and neurological outcomes (Brown et al., 2011).
Philadelphia Mindfulness Questionnaire (PHLMS). The PHLMS (Cardaciotto,
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a self-report mindfulness measure assessing
two factors: Present-Moment Awareness (PMA) and Nonjudgmental Acceptance (NJA).
Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1=never; 5=very often) according to the
frequency that an experience occurred within the past week. Exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses support the two-factor structure of awareness and
acceptance and good internal consistency was demonstrated in both clinical (Cronbach’s
α=0.75) and nonclinical (awareness: Cronbach’s α=0.75, acceptance: .82) samples
(Cardaciotto et al., 2008). While good convergent and divergent validity has been found
for the PHLMS thus far (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), less validity research has been
conducted than on such measures as the MAAS due to its more recent development. With
less validity research in comparison to the MAAS, the PHLMS was chosen as a
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secondary measure of mindfulness for the current study. This measure was included in
order to determine the correlation with the MAAS, and to reveal whether the two-factor
structure provided interesting information about the levels of awareness and acceptance
in the current sample.
Working memory capacity.
Operation Span Task (OSPAN). Working memory capacity was assessed using a
computer-based version of the Operation Span Task (OSPAN). The OSPAN (Turner &
Engle, 1989) was developed from the theoretical perspective of functional working
memory, which emphasizes the capacity of WM to store limited amounts of information
while one is concurrently involved in a separate mental activity (Engle, 2002; Baddeley
& Hitch, 1974); for example, solving a math problem while simultaneously attempting to
remember a list of words. The version of the OSPAN utilized in the current study
required participants to solve math problems while simultaneously attempting to
remember a set of words for later recall. During administration of the OSPAN
participants view one math – word combination at a time, -- referred to as a string -- on a
computer monitor. There are 15 trials, each trial consisting of two to five strings. The
order of string size varies randomly, so that participants cannot predict the number of
items from one trial to the next. On each trial, participants are asked to read the math
problem out loud, solve the math problem mentally, respond “Yes” or “No” as to whether
the equation is correct, and then read aloud the word. Immediately after the participant
reads the word, the next string is presented. Following the completion of each set, the
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participant recalls the words presented and records them on the answer sheet. For
example, a three-item set might include the following items displayed:
IS (9/2) – 1 = 1? shirt
IS (4*1) + 2 = 6? desk
IS (10*2) − 4 = 15? dog
???
Each line is presented separately; the participant’s act of stating the word at the
end of the equation is the prompt for the next math-word combination to be presented.
The question marks are a visual cue for the participants to begin to write the words on the
answer sheet. Ospan scores may be calculated a number of ways (Unsworth et al., 2005).
However a total scoring method was utilized, in which the Ospan score is the sum of the
total number of words recalled on the task. The rationale for this scoring method is that it
would provide a greater range of scores with which to group the sample into high and low
WMC subgroups, in comparison to the alternative, absolute method of scoring in which
participants only receive credit for remembering all words in a strong in the correct order.
Additionally, in order to ensure that participants are not trading off between solving the
operations and remembering the words, an 85% accuracy criterion on the math operations
was required for all participants.
During each sequence, the task of verifying math equations serves as interference
as participants attempt to maintain the co-presented words in short-term memory. A
higher frequency of words recalled correctly indicates greater WMC. The OSPAN has
demonstrated good internal consistency in previous research utilizing adult samples
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(Cronbach’s alpha=0.78; test–retest reliability r=0.83; Unsworth et al. 2005).
Additionally, both the automated and non-automated OSPAN tasks have been previously
used in recent research concerning mindfulness and WMC (Black, Semple, Pokhrel, &
Grenard, 2011; Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Stanley, Schaldach,
Kiyonaga, & Jha, 2011). Furthermore, the OSPAN includes two forms (Form A and
Form B), which allows for repeated administration and counterbalancing.
Affect.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson et al.,
1988) is one of the most widely used measures of affect. It specifically measures Positive
and Negative Affect, which are considered broad mood factors under which various
mood states are subsumed (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988). Positive Affect (PA) refers to
“the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active, and alert” (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988, p.1063). High PA would include energy and engagement, while low PA
would be characterized by melancholy and fatigue. In contrast, high Negative Affect
(NA) would involve aversive mood states such as “anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear,
and nervousness” (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, p.1063), whereas low NA would involve
being a state of calmness and tranquility. The measure consists of two 10-item self-report
mood scales which were designed to measure these two separate dimensions The NA and
PA scales have been shown to be highly internally consistent, uncorrelated, and stable
over time. Moreover, high reliability has been demonstrated in validation studies, with
Cronbach’s alphas of .89 and .85 found for positive and negative affect, respectively
(Crawford & Henry, 2004). Participants are asked to rate, on a scale from 1 (very slightly
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or not at all) to 5 (extremely) to what extent they felt a certain way during a specified
period of time. In this experiment, participants were asked to rate their affect in the
present moment, in order to detect changes in negative affect (NA) predicted to result
from the stress manipulation. The PANAS has been used in multiple studies of acute
stress (Aschbacher, Epel, Wolkowitz, Prather, Puterman, & Dhabhar, 2012; Ramsey,
2014; Stoney, Niaura, Bausserman, & Matacin, 1999; van Marle, Hermans, Qin, &
Fernández, 2009), as well as studies of mindfulness and acute or chronic stress (Jha,
Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Nyklíček, Mommersteeg, Van Beugen,
Ramakers, & Van Boxtel, 2013).
Perceived Stress
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The 10-item version of the PSS was used in the
current study as a measure of globally perceived stress (Cohen, Kamarck, &
Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Williamson, 1988).The development of the measure was
informed by principles of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional theory of stress .
Specifically, items on the PSS assess individuals’ sense of unpredictability and lack of
control in their day-to-day lives. Responses are scored on a five-point Likert scale,
ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘very often’ (4). A total perceived stress score is generated
by summing the total of all items. According to Cohen and colleagues, higher scores on
the PSS are indicative of higher levels of perceived stress. A recent study of the PSS has
found good internal reliability ranging from .78 to .91 (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012).
The PSS has been frequently used as a measure of global stress in several other studies
concerning both mindfulness and working memory (Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & Cordova,
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2005; Carmody, Baer, Lykins, & Olendzki, 2009; Lengacher et al., 2009; Klein & Boals,
2001; Mann, Canny, Reser, & Rajan, 2013), including a study of the effect of
mindfulness training on WMC by Stanley and colleagues (2011). Additionally, the PSS
has been found to have good reliability and validity with use among college students
(Roberti et al., 2006).
Blood/Injury Sensitivity.
Blood-Injection Symptom Scale. The BISS is 17-item scale frequently used as
screening measure of phobic response to blood, injections, and injury (Olatunji, personal
communication, August 26, 2012; e.g. Hermann, Schäfer, Walter, Stark, Vaitl, &
Schienle, 2007; Olatunji, Connolly, & David, 2008; Page, 2003; Hepburn & Page, 2000).
The scale was developed to assess symptoms of fear and fainting associated with bloodinjection-injury (BII) phobia as previous measures of this disorder did not fully address
the complete spectrum of possible BII symptoms (Page, Bennett, Carter, Smith, &
Woodmore, 1997). Items on the BISS consist of descriptions of various somatic
experiences and sensations. Respondents are asked to indicate whether or not they
occurred during the worst experience with blood or injections they can recall. The BISS
is comprised of three subscales, including ‘Faintness’ (e.g. dizziness, nausea, fainting;
nine items), ‘Anxiety’ (e.g. heart pounding, sweating, clammy hands; four items), and
‘Tension’ (e.g. trembling, tense/ achy muscles; four items), with possible scores ranging
from 0 to 17 (Page et al., 1997). Page and colleagues (1997) demonstrated in a large
sample of individuals with BII phobia that blood related concerns typically produce
greater scores on the faintness scale. This was of use to the present study, as syncope in
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response to images of blood within the emotional stressor was a concern for the primary
investigator. Participants who endorsed having experienced syncope in response to seeing
blood or endorsed multiple items within the Faintness subscale were excluded from the
stressor portion of the study.
Trauma Sensitivity.
PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version. The PCL–C is a well-validated and frequently
used measure designed to assess PTSD symptoms in civilian populations (e.g. Adkins,
Weathers, McDevitt-Murphy, & Daniels, 2008; Busner, Kaplan, Greco, & Sheehan,
2011; Read, Colder, Merrill, Ouimette, White, & Swartout, 2012).The scale consists of
17 items that correspond to DSM–IV symptoms of PTSD (Weathers et al., 1991, 1993).
Using a 5-point Likert-style scale, respondents indicate how much they have been
bothered by each symptom in the past month. Possible scores range from 17 to 85, and
higher scores on the PCL-C indicate a greater likelihood of PTSD. During initial
validations studies, PCL–C scores demonstrated a coefficient alpha of .97, a test–retest
reliability of .96, and convergent validity with other PTSD scales, such as the Mississippi
Scale and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI–2) Keane PTSD (PK)
Scale (Weathers et al., 1993). Additionally, Weathers and colleagues found good
diagnostic sensitivity and specificity in the original validation samples of Vietnam and
Gulf War veterans, with further validation studies performed with good results in civilian
samples of motor-vehicle accident and sexual assault victims (Blanchard, JonesAlexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). In regard to factor structure, investigations of the
PCL-C in civilian primary care populations support a four-factor model of re55

experiencing, avoidance, hyperarousal, and numbing symptoms (Asmundson, Frombach,
McQuaid, Pedrelli, Lenox, & Stein, 2000). However, a recent factor analysis of the PCLC in a non-clinical college sample found support for both a one-factor and two-factor
model of PTSD symptoms (Conybeare, Behar, Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012).
In this study, a conservative cut-point score was chosen with the intention of maximizing
detection of possible PTSD cases in the sample. The National Center for PTSD
(NCPTSD) suggests a higher cut-point score when estimated prevalence of PTSD is low
to maximize detection. Based on the NCPTSD’s recommendations for settings with an
estimated prevalence of 15% or below (e.g. general population samples), a threshold
score of 35 was chosen (NCPTSD, 2014).
Stress induction.
International Affective Picture System. Previous studies of working memory and
acute stress have utilized primarily physiological stressors (e.g. cold pressor test) to
produce a stress response in participants, and this form of stress induction has been
demonstrated to be a successful method of eliciting a stress response with consequences
for WMC (e.g. Duncko, Johnson, Merikangas, & Grillon, 2009). However, given that the
aim of the present study was to investigate the potential for mindfulness to mitigate the
cognitive cost of an acute stress reaction and associated negative affect, an emotional
stress induction technique was chosen in an effort to ensure a strong, affective reaction.
The International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) has been used as an
emotional stressor in both studies involving mindfulness (Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007;
Sauer, Walach, Schmidt, Hinterberger, Horan, & Kohls, 2011; Silverstein, Brown, Roth,
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& Britton, 2011; Taylor et al., 2011) as well as prior studies of emotion and WMC
(Mather, Mitchell, Raye, Novak, Greene, & Johnson, 2006; MacNamara, Ferri, &
Hajcak, 2011; Pearson & Sawyer, 2011; Perlstein, Elbert, & Stenger, 2002). The IAPS
consists of photographs of real people and objects selected to evoke negative, positive, or
neutral affect, and it is one of the most frequently used forms of emotion elicitation in
laboratory settings (Fechir et al., 2008; Lynch, Schneider, Zachary Rosenthal, &
Cheavens, 200). This large set of images has demonstrated good stability of affective
responses, and these responses to the slides have been exhibited across various
populations and cultures (Hamm et al., 2003). Responses to the slides are empirically
rated on two dimensions: valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal
(ranging from calm to excited). Each dimension is ranked on a 9 point scale, with 1
representing low valence or arousal and 9 representing high valence or arousal (Lang, et
al., 2005). Highly unpleasant images typically have a low valence rating and a high
arousal rating, and prior fMRI research has demonstrated that viewing such pictures
produces the same response observed in the amygdala and prefrontal cortex during fearprovoking situations (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006), as well as similar sympathetic
nervous system activation (Carter, Durocher, & Kern, 2008). Examples of such images
in the IAPS include included mutilated bodies, physical assault scenes, and accident
scenes. To create the effect of an emotional stressor, pictures which are both negatively
valenced and highly arousing were presented in a blocked fashion; a blocked presentation
refers to a method during which all pictures presented to participants have similar arousal
and valance ratings. Previous research has found that blocked presentation of IAPS
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pictures with similar affective valence consistently produces both emotional and
behavioral reactions which are sustained even after exposure to the pictures has ceased
(Azevedo et al., 2005; Mendonca-de-Souza et al., 2007; Pereira et al., 2006; Smith et al.,
2005). Additionally, research by Bradley and colleagues (2001, 2003) has shown that
viewing pictures of mutilated human bodies evokes strong psychophysiological reactions,
negative affect, and arousal in research participants, a finding that has been further
corroborated by Azevedo et al. (2005). Bradley (2001) theorized that, from a survival
perspective, visual images of same-species death and mutilation are the most threatening
visual stimuli, and therefore produces a fight-or-flight response through activation of the
sympathetic nervous system. In keeping with this theory and prior research by Bradley
and others, 24 pictures containing images of mutilated bodies were selected from the
IAPS bank. This number is consistent with previous research which utilized blocked
presentation of negatively valenced IAPS pictures to induce negative affect and a
physiological stress response (Azevedo et al., 2005; Pereira et al., 2006). Normative
mean ratings of the images based on a sample of North American men (Lang et al., 1997)
in terms of valence (nine-point scale from unpleasant to pleasant) and arousal (nine-point
scale from calm to excited) were 1.8, and 6.5, respectively. A full description of each
slide and individual valence and arousal means can be found in Appendix D.
In order to detect emotional arousal in response to the stressor, physiological
indices of arousal were utilized. Prior research using the IAPS has demonstrated
significant changes in resting heart rate during viewing of pictures (Lang et al., 1997).
Heart rate response has been noted to be useful in demonstrating sympathetic activation,
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as well as differentiating between an orienting response and a defensive response to an
aversive stimulus, as it will decelerate during orienting and accelerate during a defensive
response (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). An initial deceleration in heart rate has been
described by Lang and colleagues (1997) as participants orient to distressing IAPS
pictures, followed by heart rate acceleration as the defensive cascade of sympathetic
arousal is activated. Increases in both skin conductance and heart rate are frequently and
reliably used as physiological indicators of a defensive response to those pictures in the
system which are highly arousing and negatively valenced (Lang et al., 1997).
Procedure
Prior to beginning data collection, the informed consent document was reviewed
and signed by participants, who were given the opportunity to ask questions about the
study prior to assenting. Following this, participants were given a self-report
questionnaire packet containing a demographic information questionnaire, the PHLMS,
the MAAS, and the PANAS for completion. Following completion of these
questionnaires, baseline heart rate was determined through use of an automatic blood
pressure and heart rate monitoring cuff; resting heart rate data were collected for the
duration of inflation and deflation of the cuff, an average of approximately 15-20
seconds. Heart rate was measured following completion of questionnaires to ensure that
participants had time to acclimate to the laboratory, ambient temperature, and presence of
the investigator, as well as recovered from previous physical activity (e.g. walking to the
laboratory building, taking the stairs instead of the elevator, etc.). Although all steps were
taken to ensure a calm and comfortable environment for the participants to decrease
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potential stress-related heart rate elevations prior to the stressor, it is possible that
reactivity effects to the blood pressure cuff occurred in some participants. Participants
were then seated in front of a 19 inch LCD, color widescreen computer monitor at a
distance of approximately 48 inches. When seated facing the computer, the participants
were also facing a blank wall, and the room in which the experiment took place contained
minimal furniture and visual stimuli. Every effort was taking to maintain a quiet, nondistracting environment for the participants to minimize any effect on WMC not related
to the presentation of the stressor. Participants were then prepared for physiological
recording of HR. Physiological recordings were made using the ProComp5 Infiniti
biofeedback system, manufactured by thought technology, Ltd. The software used to
store and analyze the physiological data was the Biograph Infiniti 7900, version 5.0.3.
The inside of both forearms was first lightly abraded with a pre-moistened alcohol swab
to ensure good contact of the electrodes. Three pre-jelled sensors were then applied to
both inner wrists; negative and positive leads were located on the left wrist, and a ground
lead was attached to the right wrist. Physiological data was collected over three separate
time blocks: pre-stressor, during administration of the stressor, and post-stressor. The first
time block contained the administration of the pre-stressor Ospan and lasted, on average,
713.5 seconds. The second time block contained the administration of the screening
measures and the IAPS; this block lasted on average 372.9 seconds. The third time block
contained the administration of the post-stressor Ospan and the post-stressor PANAS, and
lasted, on average, 549.7 seconds. There were no structured breaks between time blocks.

60

Participants were then provided the OSPAN response sheet and a writing utensil,
and instructed to pay attention to and follow the OSPAN instructions presented on the
computer screen. The pre-stressor OSPAN included a brief practice period, in which
participants were instructed on the procedure for completing the task. Administrations of
the two forms of the OSPAN were counterbalanced to account for any potential carryover
effects. Participants assigned odd subject numbers for de-identification purposes received
form A pre-stressor, and participants assigned even subject numbers received form B prestressor.
Following completion of the pre-stressor OSPAN, participants remained seated at
the computer monitor and the BISS and PCL-C were administered as screening measures.
Screening measures were given following administration of the pre-stressor OSPAN to
reduce the potential effect of stress created by items on the BISS and PCL-C on
participants’ baseline WMC scores. Although participants knew from the study
description that they would be exposed to a “brief stressor,” care was taken to neither
describe the exact nature of the stressor, nor present participants with pre-stressor stimuli
that might inadvertently increase stress levels and diminish WMC prior to administration
of the baseline Ospan. The BISS and PCL-C were deemed to be potentially stressinducing, due to the high face validity of both measures. Participants who endorsed items
on the BISS related to symptoms of fainting or dizziness in response to the sight of blood,
or those whose total score exceeded a threshold of 35 on the PCL-C were excluded from
the remainder of the study. The study coordinator and/or research assistants discussed the
results of the screening process with participants who were excluded and provided them
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with psychoeducation related to any potential clinical diagnoses. All participants were
provided with information about mental health resources available at the University of
Louisville Counseling Center and the University of Louisville Psychological Services
Center, should they wish to receive follow-up counseling or a more in-depth
psychological evaluation. Several participants elected to discontinue further participation
at this time, following detailed explanation of the stress induction methodology.
Following administration of the screening measures, the IAPS was administered.
The first slide presented was a blank, white slide presented for 6 seconds. The purpose of
this slide was so that the experimenter or research assistant could have the slide show
prepared to play on the computer monitor without inadvertently exposing a participant to
an image before the official start of the stressor. Twenty-four color photos containing
images of human death and mutilation were then presented at a presentation rate of six
seconds per picture, for a total of 150 seconds including the blank slide, 144 seconds of
which were IAPS content. The presentation rate of 6 seconds per picture is the rate
suggested by IAPS developers (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001); Bradley
and colleagues (2001) have found this rate to produce heightened phasic indices of
emotion during blocked presentation of unpleasant pictures. While similar affective and
increased skin conductance responses have also been observed with briefer presentation
of unpleasant pictures (i.e. 300–500 ms; Codispoti et al., 2001), the typical presentation
rate was chosen to ensure adequate stimulus exposure and production of a defensive,
fight-or-flight response.
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During the IAPS presentation, the experimenter and/or research assistants were
seated approximately three feet to the right of the participant, so that they could observe
reactions to the IAPS and prompt participants, if necessary, to look directly at the
computer monitor during the presentation. Immediately following the last IAPS slide,
participants were administered the post-stressor OSPAN. The post-stressor OSPAN
included a brief reminder of basic instructions for completing the task, but did not include
a practice period. The rationale behind excluding a practice period was to avoid any
dissipation of acute emotional distress evoked through the stressor.
At the completion of the post-stressor OSPAN, participants were asked to
complete the final self-report questionnaire, the post-stressor PANAS. Participants were
asked to complete the PANAS based on their feelings in the present moment, just as they
had during its previous administration at the start of data collection. They were then
debriefed using the standardized script (see Appendix A) and thanked for their
participation.
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CHAPTER 3 RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Demographics. An initial sample of 131 participants was recruited into the study.
Forty-six participants were excluded from the stressor portion of the study due to scores
higher than the predetermined PCL-C cut-off score, or evidence of a BII phobia. Thirteen
participants chose to discontinue participation prior to exposure to the stressor.
Additionally, five participants’ data were excluded from final analyses due to errors with
data recording of physiological reactivity scores. Demographic data and mean scores on
initial self-report measures for those participants who were discontinued are reported in a
separate section.
The final sample consisted of sixty-seven participants. An a priori power analysis
using G*Power 3.1.3 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) software suggested a sample
size of 24 would be necessary to detect a medium effect size (f2=.4) with an alpha of .05
and a power of .05 using the proposed statistical analyses. Over sampling was conducted
to ensure adequate subsamples of low and high DM groups. As a result, the final sample
size is nearly three times larger than the minimum suggested by results of the power
analysis.
In the final sample, 61 percent of participants were female (N = 41) and 39% were
male (N = 26). Mean age was 20.12 (SD = 2.20) and mean number of college semesters
completed was 3.57 (SD = 3.11); 31 percent of the sample were in their first semester of
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college (N = 21). In regards to ethnicity, 81 percent of the sample identified as White (N
= 54), 9 percent as Black (n = 6), 5 percent as multiracial (N = 3), 3 percent as Hispanic
(N = 2), 1 percent as Indian (N = 1), and 1 percent as Asian (N = 1). Participants were
asked about previous exposure to mindfulness and meditation to ensure measures of
mindfulness reflected dispositional qualities rather than skills built from formal practice.
None had previously completed an MBSR program, and only 3% (N = 2) endorsed any
previous experience with meditation. Upon being questioned about prior meditation
practice, their experience proved to be very limited and unrelated to mindfulness.
Consequently both participants’ data were included in the final analyses.
Measures. The following section contains a summary of results of descriptive
statistics for both pre- and post-stressor measures used in the current study. A comparison
of pre- and post-stressor mean scores and standard deviations are presented below in
Table 1.
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). The mean total score for the
MAAS was 3.92 (SD=0.86). Cronbach’s α score, α = 0.898 is indicative of high internal
reliability. These scores were similar to those reported in validation studies of the MAAS
in large samples of undergraduate students (M=3.83, SD=0.70; Brown & Ryan, 2003;
M=4.00, SD=0.85, α = 0.89; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007) as well as normative
information for college students (N= 2277, M=3.83, SD=.70; Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Scores on the MAAS were normally distributed, skewness = 0.08 (SE= 0.29), kurtosis = 0.60 (SE=0.58), with no evidence of outliers.
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As analyses related to the main study hypotheses required participants to be
divided into groups of either high or low DM based on their MAAS scores, a median split
was performed on MAAS total scores of the final sample to create these groups, utilizing
the MAAS total score median of 3.80. Those categorized as high scorers (N=33) on the
MAAS became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers (N=34) became
the low DM group. There was a significant difference between the mean scores of these
two groups, t(65) = -11.79, p <.001. On average, participants categorized through the
median split as the high DM group received a score of 4.63 (SD=0.51), while the mean
score for the low DM group was 3.22 (SD=0.47).
The MAAS and the PHLMS were found to be significantly but not strongly
correlated, r(65) = 0.46, p <.01. As a strong correlation was not found, the PHLMS was
not utilized in further analyses of the primary study hypotheses. Further exploration of
the PHLMS data is contained in Appendix E.
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). The PANAS may be administered
using several different instructions related to a participant’s affective experience over
various timespans (e.g. present moment, over the past two weeks, etc.; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). For the purposes of this study, the present moment-oriented instructions
for the PANAS were utilized, which asked participants to rate how they felt “right now.”
The pre-stressor Positive Affect (PA) mean was 30.22 (SD=6.4), and mean Negative
Affect (NA) was 13.01 (SD=6.4). These scores are consistent with normative data found
for present moment-oriented instructions during the initial development and validation of
the PANAS in a large sample of undergraduate students (PA, M=29.7, SD=7.9; NA,
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M=14.8, SD=5.4; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Post-stressor PA (M=14.97,
SD=4.95) was found to be significantly lower than pre-stressor PA (M=25.09, SD=7.19),
t(65) = 7.40, p <.01.
Operation Span Task (Ospan). As previously mentioned, a total scoring method
was utilized, with which the Ospan score results from the sum of the total number of
words recalled on the task. All participants in the final sample passed the 85% accuracy
criterion on the math operations, which suggests that they were attending to the math
problems. Prior to exposure to the stressor, participant’s mean number of correct words
recalled was 30.21 (SD=4.42). In a previous study of working memory capacity in
undergraduate college students, similar mean scores were found (M=31.33, SE=0.69;
Sibley & Beilock, 2007) while a slightly lower mean score was found in a large
community sample (M=23.53, SD=7.92; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
Following exposure to the stressor, mean number of correct words recalled was 31.67
(SD=4.40). A significant difference was found for male and female participants on poststressor Ospan scores, with males recalling, on average, three more words than female
participants, t(65) = 2.22, p = .03 (males, M=33.16, SD=4.86; females, M=30.75,
SD=3.88).
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The mean PSS total score was 15.67 (SD=6.44).
This is lower than normative data from a large, national sample of individuals under the
age of 25 (M=16.78, SD=6.86; Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012), suggesting the current
sample perceived themselves as experiencing slightly less stress than what has been
previously reported by individuals in their age group. Normative studies of the PSS have
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consistently found that women typically report more perceived stress then men (Cohen &
Janicki-Deverts, 2012). PSS scores were compared between genders in the current study
to determine if there were any observable differences in total scores between genders.
No significant difference was found in PSS total mean scores between male (M=16.11,
SD = 6.33) and female participants (M=15.39, SD= 6.57), t(65) = 0.45, p = 0.66. A
regression was used to determine if participants’ baseline level of perceived stress as
measured by the PSS would predict pre-stressor Ospan scores. The PSS scores did not
significantly predict pre-test Ospan scores, b = .001, t(65) = .01, p = 0.99, suggesting that
participants’ level of perceived stress at the start of the study did not influence their prestressor Ospan scores.
Blood-Injection Sensitivity Scale (BISS). The purpose of the BISS was to
identify individuals who might experience such symptoms during the stressful exposure
task. Total scores on this measure were not utilized, nor were they incorporated into
analyses of the main study hypotheses. However, analysis of BISS total scores in the final
sample does yield some relevant data. In the final sample, the mean score for the BISS
was 3.70 (SD = 3.39), and Cronbach’s α is indicative of excellent internal reliability, α =
0.83. A previous validation study of the BISS in a large, non-clinical undergraduate
sample found that female participants endorsed more anxiety symptoms than male
participants, necessitating separate norms (Page et al., 1997). A similar pattern was found
in the present sample (female M=4.00, SD=3.68, male M=3.23, SD=2.87).
PTSD Checklist-Civilian (PCL-C). The mean score for the PCL-C in the final
sample was 25.72 (SD = 5.87), and Cronbach’s α is indicative good internal reliability, α
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= 0.765. A validation study of the PCL-C in a large, non-clinical undergraduate sample
found similar results to the current study (M = 29.12, SD = 12.31; Conybeare, Behar,
Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012).
Table 1
Comparison of Pre- and Post-stressor Mean Scores, Final Sample
Mean

S.D.

Pre-stressor Ospan

30.21

4.42

Post-stressor Ospan

31.67

4.40

Pre-stressor PANAS NA

13.01

6.4

Post-stressor PANAS NA

14.97

4.95

Pre-stressor PANAS PA

30.22

6.4

Post-stressor PANAS PA

25.09

7.19

Note. Values in bold font represent significant differences

Discontinued Sample Analyses.
Demographics. Of the initial sample of 131 participants recruited to the study, 64
were discontinued from the full study protocol. Almost all participants excluded from the
final sample were discontinued prior to stressor exposure due to their scores on screening
measures. The demographics of the discontinued sample differed in multiple areas when
compared to the demographics of the participants who completed the full study protocol.
Of the participants who were screened out of the final sample, 72 percent were female (N
= 46) compared to 61 percent female participants in the final sample. Additionally, the
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discontinued sample had an average age of 21.55 years (SD=6.37). Additionally, 64.1%
of the discontinued sample identified as White (N=41), 14.1% identified as Black (N=9),
12.5% identified as bi- or multi-racial (N=8), and the remaining participants identified as
Hispanic (N=2), other (N=2), Asian (N=1) and Native American (N=1). The discontinued
sample and final sample differed significantly by ethnic representation, c2(N=131) = 4.49,
p = .034; there were more participants who identified as an ethnicity other than White
who were discontinued from the study than who were included in the final sample.
Measures. Due to the large number of participants removed from the final
sample, pre-stressor measures completed by the discontinued sample were analyzed
separately. A summary of these analyses is presented below in Table 2.
MAAS. In the discontinued sample, the mean total score for the MAAS was 3.78
(SD=0.64). These scores were similar, although slightly lower, to those found in a
validation study of the MAAS in a large sample of undergraduate students (M=4.00,
SD=0.85, α=0.89; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). There was no significant difference in
MAAS total score between the final and discontinued sample, t(129) = 1.05, p =.30.
Moreover, there was no difference in MAAS scores due to gender, t(65) = 0.30, p =0.77,
just as in the final sample. Additionally, MAAS scores in the discontinued sample did not
predict pre-stressor Ospan total scores, b = -.01, t(60) = .63, p = 0.53.
PANAS. In the discontinued sample, the average score received for NA was 15.05
(SD=5.92), while the mean score for PA was 28.95 (SD=7.10). While there were no
significant differences reported between the final and discontinued samples regarding
positive affect, a significant difference did occur on the PANAS Negative Affect scale,
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t(129)=-2.49, p =.014. NA scores for the discontinued participants were significantly
higher than scores received by participants who remained in the final sample (M=13.01,
SD=3.06). As in the final sample, PANAS scores in the discontinued sample remain
consistent with initial normative data from the initial validation study of the measure in a
large sample of undergraduate students (PA, M=29.7, SD=7.9; NA, M=14.8, SD=5.4;
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).
Ospan. A significant difference occurred between the discontinued participants
and the final sample in regard to total number of words recalled on the pre-stressor
Ospan, t(126) = 3.50, p =.001. On average, individuals who were retained into the final
sample recalled three words more (M=30.20, SD=4.42) than those individuals who were
discontinued from the study (M=27.40, SD=4.74). The discontinued sample’s mean
score falls between average scores found in a previous working memory study of
undergraduate students (M=31.33, SE=0.69; Sibley & Beilock, 2007) and the mean score
in a study utilizing a large community sample (M=23.53, SD=7.92; Unsworth et al.,
2005).
Due to the significant difference between the discontinued sample and final
sample in representation of ethnic minorities, data was analyzed for any trends across
study measures related to this demographic characteristic. The only significant difference
which emerged between ethnic minorities and participants identifying as White occurred
on the Ospan total score, t(126) =-4.05, p <.001. On average, participants identifying as
ethnic minorities recalled three less words on the Ospan (M = 26.22, SD = 4.60) than
those who identified as White (M = 29.85, SD = 4.48).
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PSS. Average scores on the PSS were significantly higher for the discontinued
sample (M=19.73, SD=6.23) than the final sample (M=15.67, SD=6.44), t(129) = -3.67,
p <.001. PSS scores did not significantly predict pre-test Ospan scores, b = -.128, t(60) =
-.988, p = 0.33. In the discontinued sample, PSS total scores were significantly and
positively correlated with both the PCL-C total scores r(59) = 0.39, p =.002 ,as well as
with the NA subscale of the PANAS, r(59) = .48, p < .001. Moreover, PSS scores were
found to be inversely correlated with MAAS total scores in the discontinued sample,
r(62) = -0.40, p < .01.
BISS. As previously mentioned, total scores on the BISS were not utilized as part
of the study; items targeting specific symptoms of BII phobia (e.g. dizziness or fainting)
were utilized as the part of the pre-stressor screening procedure. However, analysis of
BISS total scores in the discontinued sample did yield some interesting data. The mean
score for the BISS in the discontinued sample was 28.61 (SD=4.22), compared to the
final sample’s mean of 3.70 (SD=3.39).
PCL-C. The mean score for the PCL-C in the discontinued sample was 38.77
(SD=8.95), significantly higher than the mean score found in the final sample, t(126) = 9.84, p <.01. Moreover, the discontinued sample reported, on average, more symptoms of
PTSD than did undergraduate students in a recent validation study of the PCL-C
(M=29.12, SD=12.31; Conybeare, Behar, Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012).
Further investigation of PCL-C data in the discontinued sample demonstrated
associations between the PCL-C and several other measures. PCL-C scores were
positively correlated with the PSS, r(59) =0.39, p < .01, as well as positively correlated
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with the NA subscale of the PANAS, r(59) = 0.43, p = .001. Additionally, PCL-C scores
in the discontinued sample were found to be inversely correlated with mean Ospan total
scores, r(59) = -0.25, p =.05.
Table 2
Comparison of Final and Discontinued Sample Mean Scores

MAAS

PANAS NA

PANAS PA

Ospan

PSS

BISS

Mean

S.D.

Final Sample

3.92

0.86

Discontinued Sample

3.78

0.64

Final Sample

13.01

6.4

Discontinued Sample

15.05

5.92

Final Sample

30.22

6.4

Discontinued Sample

28.95

7.10

Final Sample

30.21

4.42

Discontinued Sample

27.40

4.74

Final Sample

15.67

6.44

Discontinued Sample

19.73

6.23

Final Sample

3.70

3.39

Discontinued Sample

28.61

4.22
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PCL-C

Final Sample

25.72

5.87

Discontinued Sample

38.77

8.95

Note. Values in bold font represent significant differences

Main Analyses
Hypothesis 1. It was hypothesized that contrasting trends in working memory
capacity (WMC) pre- and post-stressor scores would occur, and would be moderated by
dispositional mindfulness (DM). It was also predicted that the low DM group will display
a significant decrease in WMC while the high DM group would not display a significant
decrease in WMC following the presentation of the stressor.
A 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to
examine group differences in pre- and post-stressor Ospan performance. Test condition
(i.e. pre- vs post-stressor) and DM category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping
variables, with Ospan total recall scores served as the dependent variable. The main
effect of test condition was significant, F(1, 64), = 11.49, p <.01. Contrary to what was
predicted, mean Ospan post-stressor scores (M=31.67; SD=4.40) were higher than mean
Ospan scores pre-stressor (M=30.21, SD=4.42). The main effect of DM category,
F(1,64), = 0.01, p = .91, was not found to be significant. In addition, the interaction
between Ospan score x DM category was not found to be statistically significant, F< 1.
Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that contrasting trends in negative affect (NA)
pre- and post-stressor scores would occur, moderated by dispositional mindfulness (DM).
It was also predicted that the high DM group would not display a significant increase in
NA and that the low DM group would display a significant increase in NA following
presentation of the stressor.
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To test whether group differences in pre- and post-stressor levels of NA,
measured by the NA subscale of the PANAS, would be moderated by DM, a 2 (Test
condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of NA was
significant, F (1, 64), = 13.60., p < .01. Post-stressor PANAS negative affect scores
(M=14.97, SD=4.95) were higher than PANAS negative affect scores pre-stressor
(M=13.02, SD=3.06). The main effect of DM group, F (1,64), = 2.97, p =0.09, was not
found to be statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction between NA X DM
category, F<1, was not found to be statistically significant.
Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesized that greater physiological reactivity during
stressor presentation, measured by heart rate (HR), would be observed in the low DM
group than in the high DM group. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the low DM
group will display higher overall HR during the stressor presentation than the high DM
group.
Although physiological data was collected from all 67 participants in the final
sample, data from 18 participants was excluded either due to missing or corrupted data.
Thus, the following statistical analyses were based on the data from 49 participants. Of
these 49 participants, 59.2 percent were female (N=29) and the mean age was 20.33 years
old (SD=2.32).
Heart rate data were collected during the IAPS presentation. Baseline HR had
been previously collected following each participant’s completion of self-report measures
at the start of the protocol, and was used as the pre-stressor measure of HR. To determine
if HR was affected through exposure to the IAPS presentation in the sample as a whole,
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HR was averaged across the time period during which the participants viewed the IAPS
images (150 seconds; M=78.75 beats per minute, SD=14.37) and then compared to
participants’ mean baseline heart rate (M=77.24 beats per minute, SD=14.77).
A 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to
examine group differences in pre- and stressor HR. Test condition (i.e. pre- vs stressor)
and DM category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping variables, with HR as the
dependent variable. The main effect of test condition was not significant, F(1, 47), =
1.62, p =.21. Moreover, the main effect of DM category, F<1, was not significant. In
addition, the interaction between HR x DM category was not statistically significant,
F<1.
As no significant results were identified through use of the mean HR over the
course of the IAPS, the mean HR at the end of the IAPS presentation was calculated
(M=85 beats per minute, SD=25.37) in an effort to determine whether use of this data
point would produce different results. A paired sample t-test demonstrated a significant
difference between baseline HR (M=77.69, SD=14.59) and final HR data collected at the
end of the stressor, t(47) = -2.413, p =.02, indicating that between the collection of the
baseline HR and the end of the IAPS presentation, HR increased significantly, an
average of eight beats per minute. A comparison of high and low DM HR data revealed
no significant difference t(46)=.63, p =.53.
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION
Primary Findings
It was originally predicted that working memory capacity (WMC) post-stressor
scores would be lower than pre-stressor scores, moderated by dispositional mindfulness
(DM). Additionally, it was predicted that participants in the low DM group would display
a significant decrease in WMC, while high DM group members would not show a
significant decrease in WMC following stressor. Results of the statistical analyses failed
to support this hypothesis; moreover, the trend which emerged regarding WMC was a
slight increase in Ospan scores following the stressor presentation. No differences were
found between DM groups.
It is interesting that that compared to participants’ mean baseline HR, HR at the
end of the stressor presentation was elevated. Within the study protocol, the post-stressor
Ospan directly followed the stressor presentation, which means that participants entered
into this test of WMC with slightly elevated HR (on average, 5 BPM more than baseline
resting HR). The fact that Ospan scores were higher post-stressor than they were prior to
the IAPS presentation, coupled with this elevation, suggests that the level of
physiological arousal experienced on average was potentially enough to enhance
cognitive abilities, and yet not high enough to engender the predicted decrease in
cognitive functioning which has been observed in other studies utilizing this stressor.
Moreover, the current study was able to demonstrate a change, although slight, in HR
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following presentation of the IAPS. This finding is consistent with extant literature
concerning the IAPS and its ability to produce measurable physiological arousal. The
small amount of change which occurred is itself interesting, and potential theories and
implications concerning the impact of the IAPS on this sample will be discussed further
in a later section.
In regard to the hypothesis that changes in NA, measured by the NA subscale of
the PANAS, would be seen from baseline to post-stressor, participants as a group
experienced an increase in NA following exposure to the IAPS. This finding is consistent
with previous IAPS literature documenting negatively valenced images’ ability to create
a negative affective state in individuals. Moreover, PA scores following exposure to the
IAPS were significantly lower than they had been at baseline, demonstrating a parallel
process of increasing NA and decreasing PA in the current study. Although no
differences were seen between DM groups in regard to the changes in negative or
positive affect produced through the IAPS presentation, this study further supports the
utility of the IAPS in creating changes in affect. Moreover, the blocked style of
presentation used for the IAPS images in the current study is not as prominent in the
extant literature as other presentation formats (i.e. combining negative and positively
valenced images, or combining valenced images with neutral images). This study
provides further documentation of significant change in both positive and negative
affective states resulting from a blocked presentation style.
This was a study which made use of a widely researched and well validated
measure of DM, the MAAS. However, it is important to note that the concept of DM has
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not yet been fully formalized. As mentioned in the initial literature review, multiple
definitions of mindfulness currently exist. Brown and Ryan (2003), developers of the
MAAS, define dispositional mindfulness as a spectrum of conscious experience along
which individual differences lie, with consistent mindful attention at the high end of the
spectrum and habitual, automatic thinking, at the low end. The MAAS, therefore,
provides information related to the trait-like frequency with which an individual has
access to a mindful state of attention and present-moment awareness. Analysis of the
MAAS yielded several findings of importance related to both the measure and the
concept of DM. First, the average level of DM found in the current study through the
MAAS was a replication of previous findings in validation studies of the measure as well
as its normative data (Brown & Ryan, 2003; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). Secondly,
DM as defined by Brown and Ryan (2003) was found to be normally distributed across
the sample, with scores on the MAAS ranging at the low end of DM at 2.07 to the high
end at 5.80. Scores on the MAAS range from one to six, suggesting that this sample may
have a slightly restricted range. However, the results do display variance in reported DM
in a sample of mindfulness-naïve, undergraduate students. As a result, this study further
demonstrated the ability of the MAAS to measure mindfulness on a dispositional level in
undergraduate college students.
Additionally, it is important to note the structure of the MAAS allowed the
current study to compare individuals along the previously mentioned spectrum of
mindfulness. The MAAS is written so that during scoring of the measure item scores are
reversed (e.g. It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of what I'm
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doing) in order to determine an individual’s level of mindful attention and awareness.
Strong endorsement of the items as they are written would indicate an individual with
tendencies toward “mindlessness”, or someone with very little capacity for present
moment attention and awareness. Specifically, Brown and Ryan (2003) define
mindlessness as “the relative absence of mindfulness” or an individual who does not
“acknowledge or attend to a thought, emotion, motive, or object of perception” (p.823).
The fact that the MAAS is able to assess both mindfulness and mindlessness was a
strength within the present study’s design. The initial theoretical framework which
influenced the study’s development and hypotheses proposed a differing process of
events for individuals high in mindfulness versus those high in mindlessness. Use of the
MAAS allowed for measurement of both mindfulness and mindlessness. Within the study
design, individuals who were identified through the median split of the MAAS as part of
the low DM group did tend to endorse more qualities of “mindlessness”, in comparison to
the high DM group who tended to endorse more qualities of mindfulness. Thus, both
poles of the spectrum of mindful ability were represented in the subsequent analyses, and
in keeping with the theoretical framework of the study.
The current study examined only dispositional mindfulness, as opposed to
mindfulness associated with formal training. Indeed, care was taken to ensure
measurement of dispositional mindfulness rather than the effects of formal training by
utilizing a mindfulness-naïve sample and using formal mindfulness training or intentional
mindfulness practice as exclusion criteria. Future studies should compare groups of
individuals identified as having high levels of dispositional mindfulness versus those
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reporting high levels of mindfulness following formal mindfulness training. As the
concept of dispositional mindfulness is still evolving in regard to conceptualization and
measurement, such studies may shed light on differences in cognitive abilities and
functioning between those with formal mindfulness training and those identified as
simply having naturally occurring mindful traits and qualities.
One concern during creation of the current study’s design was related to
participants’ baseline level of perceived stress upon entering the study. Because stress
levels affect WMC performance, it was thought that undergraduate students participating
in the current study under a large amount of perceived stress might display less variation
in their Ospan scores from pre- to post-stressor. Additionally, it was considered that
environmental stressors (e.g. midterm or final exams) might create within-group cohorts
of individuals with lower pre-stressor Ospan scores when compared to students who
participated during less stressful academic periods. Due to this concern, the PSS had been
added to the study protocol as a measure of perceived stress. Fortunately, concerns
regarding the impact of perceived stress on pre-stressor Ospan scores were unfounded, as
analysis of the PSS and baseline Ospan suggested participants’ level of perceived stress
did not predict their pre-stressor Ospan scores. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate
the efficacy of the current study in measuring WMC before and after a discrete emotional
stressor, without intrusion of globally perceived stress potentially complicating study
results.
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Ancillary Findings
Additionally, although not directly related to the main study hypotheses, several
interesting observations were made through careful analysis of the demographic
characteristics of the current study’s sample. First, the screening procedure resulted in a
sample of participants containing more female participants and more participants
identifying as ethnic minorities than the sample retained through the entire study
protocol. Not only is this finding interesting, but it does have implications for the
generalizability of the study results, as well as implications for future studies which may
utilize similar protocols. As previously mentioned, women more frequently endorse
symptoms of anxiety and are more frequently diagnosed with anxiety disorders than men
(Egloff & Schmukle, 2004; McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema,
2012). Moreover, a recent study of PTSD risk and prevalence across ethnic groups using
a large, national sample found increased prevalence rate and higher number of reported
symptoms for African Americans when compared to non-Hispanic whites and as well as
other ethnic minority groups (Roberts, Gilman, Breslau, Breslau, & Koenen, 2011); the
majority of those identifying as an ethnic minority within the current study specifically
identified as African American. The findings of the current study pertaining to these
demographic differences resulting from the screening process may be useful to future
studies utilizing a similar procedure. Using different cut-points for screening measures
based on gender or ethnic status might allow for inclusion of certain participant groups
within the final sample, allowing for greater generalization of results.
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A second finding of interest was that participants in the discontinued sample
reported significantly higher levels of both perceived stress and negative affect than did
their peers who continued through the study protocol. The results indicate the efficacy of
the PCL-C and the BISS in identifying individuals experiencing higher levels of stress,
and who are more likely to be experiencing a negative affective state than their
counterparts in the final study. Future research on measures of specific anxiety disorders,
such as PTSD or BII phobia, may wish to focus on identifying cut-points related to
general levels of anxious distress versus those cut-points with good clinical utility in
identifying individuals likely to meet full diagnostic criteria.
Limitations
Stressor. There are several reasons why Ospan scores may have increased from
pre-stressor to post-stressor. As previously mentioned, it is possible that the stress level
induced via the IAPS was not high enough to engender the predicted decrease in
cognitive functioning which has been observed in other studies utilizing this stressor.
Over the past several decades, the level of violence and physical injury portrayed in
popular media has significantly increased, to include television programming, cinema,
and video games. It is possible that this study’s sample of undergraduate students may
have been desensitized to images of death and injury to an extent that viewing static
IAPS images did not cause a full-scale activation of the sympathetic nervous system.
Supporting this theory is the physiological data collected during the study in the form of
HR; only a very slight increase was seen between baseline HR and final HR collected at
the end of the IAPS presentation (an average increase of 5 beats per minute).
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Additionally, neurocognitive literature suggests that moderate levels of acute stress result
in improved cognitive functioning (Hidalgo et al., 2011; Lewis, Nikolova, Chang, &
Weekes, 2008; Mohan, Sharma, & Bijlani, 2011; Weerda, Muehlhan, Wolf, & Thiel,
2010), which would provide an explanation for the slight increase observed in poststressor Ospan scores.
To control for potential cultural habituation toward images of death and injury,
additional screening questions could have been utilized to identify those participants who
frequently view media with high levels of violence and imagery of human death and
injury. If the cultural habituation hypothesis is correct, the static nature of the IAPS
images may also have been less stress-inducing than a video clip. Other laboratory stress
induction studies have utilized brief clips from violent movies to induce stress and
negative affect with good success (del Palacio-González & Clark, 2013; Cousijn et al.,
2010; Henckens, Hermans, Pu, Joëls, & Fernández, 2009; Ossewaarde et al., 2010 ; van
Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2009). Use of such stressful, negative affect inducing
clips for commercially available films may have been a more appropriate stressor for the
sample utilized in the current study.
If the IAPS did not engender a stress response strong enough to activate the
sympathetic nervous system, it is possible that the level of NA produced was similarly
not high enough to be differentiated between the two DM groups. In other words, the
current study’s stressor may have only produced moderate levels of NA across both DM
groups, whereas a more salient stressor might have produced levels of NA high enough to
display variation between low and high DM groups. In support of this reasoning, pre84

stressor MAAS scores significantly and negatively predicted NA scores. This finding is
in line with current mindfulness research that individuals reporting higher levels of
mindfulness simultaneously report lower levels of negative affect (Chambers, Lo, &
Allen, 2008; Jha et al., 2010; Schutte & Malouff, 2011; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011).
Following the stressor, MAAS scores are no longer predictive of NA. Instead, MAAS
scores significantly predicted post-stressor PA scores, which are again in line with
current mindfulness research findings that individuals with higher levels of mindfulness
report higher levels of positive affect. Thus, while NA scores were elevated post-stressor,
appears that this increase may have been to a comparable degree for both high and low
DM individuals.
Future studies utilizing the IAPS as an emotional stressor may also wish to utilize
a sample with a broader age range to reduce potential of a cohort effect, or compare
reported level of stress across varying age groups. The college sample utilized in the
current study is a limitation itself, both in the previously discussed manner of a potential
age related cohort effect, as well as in the difficulty in generalizing to broader
populations. Use of a community sample in conjunction with the less restrictive screening
approach may have resulted in a different outcome in regard to the impact of the stressor.
Screening procedure. Another possible explanation for this study’s failure to
support the initial hypotheses related to WMC and DM may lie in the screening
procedures utilized as part of the protocol. Due to the graphic nature of the IAPS images
chosen to serve as an emotional stressor, an extremely conservative screening approach
was used. It was of importance to the primary investigator that the screening protocols
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ensure any participants who might have a strong, negative reaction to the images were
not exposed to the stressor. Clinical concerns included participants who might meet
criteria for Blood-injection-injury phobia (BII) or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
BII phobia is relatively common, with a lifetime prevalence of 3.5% (Bienvenu & Eaton,
1998). Moreover, a symptom unique to BII phobia is a strong vasovagal response (e.g.,
fainting; Barlow, 2002; Mednick & Claar, 2012); as the majority of the IAPS images
contained blood, the possibility of a vasovagal reaction in participants with undetected
BII phobia was a concern.
In regards to PTSD as a clinical concern, a recent study of a large, nonclinical
college sample found 67% had been exposed to a traumatic stressor at some point in their
life, with 4.3% meeting full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD (Elhai, Miller, Ford, Biehn,
Palmieri, & Frueh, 2012). A similar study found 66% of a large, undergraduate sample
reported exposure to a traumatic stressor, and 9% met full diagnostic criteria for PTSD
(Read, Ouimette, White, Colder, & Farrow, 2011). In addition, the university recruitment
site is located in an urban environment with a diverse student body, many of whom are
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and are first generation college students. Lower
socioeconomic status has been found to be a significant risk factor for increased risk of
PTSD development in young people (DiGangi, Gomez, Mendoza, Jason, Keys &
Koenen, 2013; Enlow, Blood, & Egeland, 2013; Milan, Zona, Acker, & Turcios-Cotto,
2013).
Thus, while it was felt that a stringently conservative approach to pre-stressor
screening was both warranted and appropriate, an unintended consequence may have
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been the exclusion of individuals who would have found the IAPS images stressful
enough to induce the reduction in WMC performance. Those participants who were
exposed to the stressor, and whose data were included in the analyses may represent a
resilient subsample, with underlying protective traits or factors minimizing the impact of
the stressor. Supporting this hypothesis are the higher PSS scores were seen in the
discontinued sample when compared to the final sample. Previous research has found
measures of resiliency to be inversely associated with the PSS (Connor & Davidson,
2003; Vaishnavi, Connor, & Davidson, 2007; Sood, Prasad, Schroeder, & Varkey, 2011).
In retrospect, solutions to the screening issue could have included raising the
PCL-C cut-point to a less conservative score, use of a PTSD measure with higher
specificity, or use of a structured diagnostic interview to exclude only individuals
meeting diagnostic criteria for PTSD or BII phobia. Stress induction studies utilizing an
emotional stressor must take a dialectical approach between protecting participants from
unnecessary psychological harm and inducing enough psychological distress to study the
emotional and physical sequelae of this process. Erring too far in either direction of this
research dialectic may result in negative consequences for the entirety of the study,
whether it involve triggering a potentially significant, negative psychological reaction in
a participant or losing access to potentially significant data; it is likely that the current
study’s protocol resulted in the latter case.
Conclusion
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the potential role of
dispositional mindfulness in mediating emotional reactivity and working memory
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degradation in the context of an acutely stressful event. The study’s design and initial
hypotheses were grounded in a conceptual model of mindfulness and WMC in the
context of acute stress presented previously in this manuscript. Based on this conceptual
framework, DM was proposed to act as a buffer against WMC loss, due to a tendency by
mindful individuals to exhibit less emotional reactivity and experience less cognitive
intrusions when they are under stress. In the current study, presentation of an acute,
emotional stressor did engender heightened NA, as well as some physiological changes.
These findings support the basic structure of the conceptual model, and are consistent
with other research findings resulting from a similar stressor. In contradiction of the
conceptual model’s proposal that WMC would either decline or be maintained due to
variations in levels of dispositional mindfulness, scores on a WMC measure actually
showed a slight increase following the presentation of an acute stressor.
Due to the support of the conceptual model through extant literature regarding
WMC loss following acutely stressful events, it is likely that the current study did not
utilize an adequate stress induction task. Failing to engender the necessary stress response
likely caused the deviations from the conceptual model seen in the findings of the current
study. Moreover, the conceptual model places emphasis on a two-step appraisal process
which is theorized to occur directly following the acute stressor and immediately prior to
proposed mediation of cognitive abilities by mindful traits. During the appraisal process,
the individual first appraises whether or not the external event merits categorization as an
acute stressor, defined as an immediate threat to emotional or physical integrity (Salas,
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996). Secondly, and only if the event is determined to be a threat,
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the individual appraises his or her own internal experience of the stressor to determine
whether it can be managed effectively. During application of a laboratory stressor, it is
difficult to approximate any form of threat toward emotional or physical integrity.
Additionally, participants entered into the laboratory setting with the knowledge that they
were free to end their participation and withdraw from the study at any time. This ability
to escape a potential threat is often unavailable to individuals experiencing a “real world”
stressor, necessitating the secondary appraisal of their own experience to determine their
capability for management of the stressor. These aspects of the conceptual model and the
realities of laboratory-based stress induction also likely contributed with the difficulty in
creating the necessary stress response.
Major implications for the current study include a more adequate stress induction
task as well as a less stringent screening process. It is proposed that with these two
significant alterations to the current study’s protocol, results may have been more closely
aligned to the original conceptual framework around which the study was designed.
Regardless of these shortcomings, the current study did generate a host of intriguing data
related to the constructs of mindfulness and working memory in the context of acute
stress. Research involving acute stress and potential mediators of the affective, cognitive
and behavioral aftereffects of acutely stressful events is not only intriguing, but also
necessary. Outside of the laboratory setting, acutely stressful events can range from
public speaking to a motor vehicle accident to a physical assault. Moreover, the ending of
the United States’ involvement in Middle Eastern military conflicts has created a large
population of American veterans, many of whom have experienced a multitude of acutely
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stressful, combat-related events. Despite the fact that the current study’s initial
hypotheses were demonstrated to be unfounded, it is hoped that the findings of this study
are able to contribute to furthering the understanding of the human experience in the
context of an acutely stressful event.
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Appendix A
Description of Study on SONA Website

You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by Paul Salmon, PhD,
principal investigator, and Lauren Vines, M.S., project director. The study is sponsored
by the University of Louisville, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences and will
take place at the Biobehavioral Research Laboratory, located in Rm. 320, Lutz Hall.

The purpose of this study is to learn about the relationships between mindfulness (the
ability to be non-judgmental and present-moment focused), a specific type of short-term
memory, and stress. Participating in the study will require only one visit and take
approximately 1 hour. Participants will be asked to complete several questionnaires and
as well as tasks on a computer.

Eligibility requirements: University of Louisville undergraduate students who do not
have a formal meditation practice, and who have never participated in a MindfulnessBased Stress Reduction Program.
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Appendix B
Research Protocol and Script
Note: When running participants, the experimenters should act in a neutral emotional
state (not overly friendly or overly cold) to minimize any effect of their demeanor on
the affect of participants prior to the emotional stressor.
When participant arrives
Are you here for an experiment? What is your name?
Do you have a cell phone with you? If yes, please turn it off or on silent– not on
vibrate.
You can have a seat right here. Participant is seated at computer table.
Consent Form & Introduction
First I have a form that tells you a little bit about the study. [Hand to them] Let
me know if you have any questions. Participant signs two copies of consent form
(one copy is given to them). Any questions asked by the participant are answered as
thoroughly as possible.
The purpose of this study is to examine how types of people perform certain
tasks after experiencing stress. We really appreciate it if you give your full
attention and effort to the tasks you are asked to perform during the experiment.
First we will be collecting some information about you, using these
questionnaires. Please take as long as you need to complete them. Give participant
questionnaire packet. Answer any questions as thoroughly as possible.
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Now we will be taking your blood pressure and heart rate using this blood pressure
cuff, just like at the doctor’s office. We will be taking your heart rate again later in
the experiment and will compare it to your resting heart rate now. Using blood
pressure cuff, take blood pressure and resting heart rate. If participant asks what their
blood pressure or resting heart rate is, tell them. Remove blood pressure cuff. Now I
will attach these sensors to your forearm and finger tips so we can measure your
heart rate and skin conductance throughout the remainder of the experiment.
Before I do so, could you please take this alcohol wipe and vigorously rub the inside
of your forearms with it. This will help us get a better reading from the sensors.
Hand pre-moistened alcohol wipe to participant. If necessary prompt them to scrub
vigorously. Attach skin conductance and EKG electrodes. Check physio program to make
sure you are receiving data from the electrodes. Move to alternate locations if necessary.
Next you will be performing several computer tasks, and there will be instructions
on the screen walking you through these. First you will be given an opportunity to
practice the task. Again, please make sure to give it your full attention and effort. If
you have any questions, or if the computer tells you to get the experimenter, I will be
right here. Begin physio recording. Begin Ospan program. Answer questions as needed.
Pre-stressor Ospan
When the participant finishes the practice period, say, Go ahead and read through
these instructions, and just let me know if you have any questions. Press ENTER to
begin. Okay, you can begin when you’re ready. When Ospan is complete, end physio
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recording and save. Begin second block of physio recording and place screeners in front
of participant.
Screener
I have a few more questionnaires that I would like for you to complete. Administer
PCL-C and BISS. Answer questions as necessary.
If they do not pass the screeners: Based on how you answered these questions, I
believe that you will have a very intense reaction to viewing the pictures shown
during the study. Thank you for your interest in participating; at this time we
will have to discontinue the study. If any of the symptoms you reported have
been causing you difficulties, I’d like to give you some information about
resources here at UofL that might be helpful to you. You may now break with the
formal script and use a warm interpersonal manner. Describe the UofL PSC as well as
counseling center. You may provide brief psychoeducation on BII phobia and/or
PTSD as warranted. .
If they pass screeners: Thank you. We can continue with the experiment.
IAPS Slides
Next I will be showing you the pictures we talked about earlier. Please try to look at
them for the full amount of time they are on the screen, even if you feel like closing
your eyes or looking away. Pull up the IAPS slide show and play slide show.
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If participant asks what they should do while looking at the pictures, say “Just try to
look at the pictures for the full amount of time they are shown.”
When IAPS slide show ends, end second block of physio recording and save data.
Begin new block of physio data recording. Begin the post-stressor OSPAN.
Post-stressor OSPAN (alternate form)
The IAPS slides are being used as an emotional stressor, and have reliably produced
negative affect in previous studies. It is important to continue using a neutral tone with
the participant at this time, regardless of any observable change in affect. The one
exception would be if a participant requests to discontinue during presentation of the
slide show.
Next you will perform several computer tasks similar to those you completed before;
the instructions are the same however there will not be a practice period. Please
begin.
Post-stressor PANAS
Administer PANAS immediately following completion of the post-stressor OSPAN.
Please complete this final questionnaire based on how you feel at the current
moment, right now.
Debriefing

120

When the participant completes the post-stressor PANAS, hand them the debriefing
sheet: Here’s a sheet telling you what this study is about. We were looking at how
the ability to be in the present moment and accepting of certain feelings impact how
people perform on certain tasks after they have been exposed to something that is
emotionally stressful. Some people have a strong ability to be present-moment
focused and accepting of difficult emotions as part of their personality, something
we call mindfulness, and some people less so. However, we can teach people to be
more mindful through exercises such as meditation. If being mindful can help
people perform certain tasks better after an emotional stressor, it may be important
to give this type of training to people who may face emotional stressors frequently as
part of their job, such as soldiers, law enforcement, and emergency personnel. Do
you have any questions? Thank you so much for participating in this study.
Answer any questions the participant may have. Now that the study is complete it is no
longer necessary for you to maintain a neutral tone. Thank them for their participation.
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Appendix C
Measures
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS)
Day-to-Day Experiences
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using
the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have
each experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather
than what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from
every other item.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Almost Always Very frequently Somewhat Frequently Somewhat Infrequently Very Infrequently Almost Never

1) I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until
sometime later.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2) I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or
1 2 3 4 5 6
thinking of something else.
3) I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4) I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention
1 2 3 4 5 6
to what I experience along the way.
5) I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they
1 2 3 4 5 6
really grab my attention.
6) I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the first
1 2 3 4 5 6
time.
7) It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of
what I'm doing.

1 2 3 4 5 6

8) I rush through activities without being really attentive to them

1 2 3 4 5 6

9) I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with
what I'm doing right now to get there.

1 2 3 4 5 6

10) I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm

1 2 3 4 5 6
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doing.
11) I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else 1 2 3 4 5 6
at the same time.
12) I drive places on "automatic pilot" and then wonder why I went there. 1 2 3 4 5 6
13) I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.

1 2 3 4 5 6

14) I find myself doing things without paying attention.

1 2 3 4 5 6

15) I snack without being aware that I'm eating.

1 2 3 4 5 6
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PHLMS
Instructions: Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Circle the number that
best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.
1

2

3

4

5

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Very Often

1.

I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind.

2.

I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions.
1
2
3
4
5
When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about.
1
2
3
4
When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body.

5

I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind.
1
2
3
4
When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body.

5

1

1

2

2

3

4

3

4

5

5

I wish I could control my emotions more easily.
1
2
3
4
5
When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face.

1

2

3

4

5

10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts.
1
2
3
4
11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily.

5

4

5

12. There are things I try not to think about.
1
2
3
4
13. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes.

5

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

5

14. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad.
1
2
3
4
5
15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting tense.

1

2

3

4
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5

16. If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of my mind.
1
2
3
4
5
17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately.

1

2

3

4

5

18. I try to put my problems out of my mind.
1
2
3
4
5
19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing.

1

2

3

4

5

20. When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away.

1

2

3
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4

5

PANAS Questionnaire
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.
1

2

3

4

5

Very Slightly
or

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

Not at All
_________ 1. Interested

_________ 11. Irritable

_________ 2. Distressed

_________ 12. Alert

_________ 3. Excited

_________ 13. Ashamed

_________ 4. Upset

_________ 14. Inspired

_________ 5. Strong

_________ 15. Nervous

_________ 6. Guilty

_________ 16. Determined

_________ 7. Scared

_________ 17. Attentive

_________ 8. Hostile

_________ 18. Jittery

_________ 9. Enthusiastic

_________ 19. Active

_________ 10. Proud

_________ 20. Afraid

Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
References
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegan, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive
and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6),
1063–1070.
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Perceived Stress Scale
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last
month. In each case, you will be asked to indicate by circling how often you felt or
thought a certain way.
Age ________ Gender (Circle): M F Other

0 = Never
Often

1 = Almost Never

2 = Sometimes

3 = Fairly Often 4 = Very

1. In the last month, how often have you been upset
because of something that happened unexpectedly?..................................... 0 1 2 3 4
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable
to control the important things in your life?...................................................... 0 1 2 3 4
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and “stressed”? .............. 0 1 2 3 4
4. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability
to handle your personal problems?................................................................. 0 1 2 3 4
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that things
were going your way?...................................................................................... 0 1 2 3 4
6. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope
with all the things that you had to do? ............................................................. 0 1 2 3 4
7. In the last month, how often have you been able
to control irritations in your life?....................................................................... 0 1 2 3 4
8. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things?..... 0 1 2 3 4
9. In the last month, how often have you been angered
because of things that were outside of your control? ..................................... 0 1 2 3 4
10. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties
were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?............................ 0 1 2 3 4
The PSS Scale is reprinted with permission of the American Sociological Association, from Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., and
Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global measure of perceived stress. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 24, 386-396.
Cohen, S. and Williamson, G. Perceived Stress in a Probability Sample of the United States. Spacapan, S. and Oskamp, S.
(Eds.) The Social Psychology of Health. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988.
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The Blood-Injection Symptom Scale
These questions ask about sensations that you may experience in situations involving blood or
injections. For each sensation, circle 'yes' if you noticed the sensation during one of your worst
experiences involving blood or injections and circle 'no' if you did not notice the sensation during
one of your worst experiences involving blood or injections.
1. Did you have tightness, pain or discomfort in
your chest?

No/Yes

2. Were you anxious?

No/Yes

3. Did you have blurred vision?

No/Yes

4. Did you have cold or clammy hands?

No/Yes

5. Were you dizzy or lightheaded?

No/Yes

6. Did you feel faint?

No/Yes

7. Were you fatigued?

No/Yes

8. Did you faint?

No/Yes

9. Did you feel unreal?

No/Yes

10. Did your heart pound?

No/Yes

11. Were you particularly irritable?

No/Yes

12. Did you feel nauseous?

No/Yes

13. Did the room spin?

No/Yes

14. Did you sweat?

No/Yes

15. Did your muscles feel tense, sore, or ache?

No/Yes

16. Did you tremble?

No/Yes

17. Did you have trouble walking?

No/Yes

128

PCL-C
Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in response to
stressful life
experiences. Please read each one carefully, put an “X” in the box to indicate how much
you have been bothered by that problem in the last month.
Not at
A little Moderately Quite a
Extremely
.
Response

1.

Repeated, disturbing memories,
thoughts, or images of a stressful
experience from the past?

2.

Repeated, disturbing dreams of a
stressful experience from the past?

3.

Suddenly acting or feeling as if a
stressful experience were
happening again (as if you were
reliving it)?

4.

Feeling very upset when
something reminded you of a
stressful experience from the past?

5.

Having physical reactions (e.g.,
heart pounding, trouble breathing,
or sweating) when something
reminded you of a stressful
experience from the past?

6.

Avoid thinking about or talking
about a stressful experience from
the past or avoid having feelings
related to it?

7.

Avoid activities or situations
because they remind you of a
stressful experience from the past?

all

bit

(1)

(2)
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(3)

bit

(4)

(5)

8.

Trouble remembering important
parts of a stressful experience
from the past?

9.

Loss of interest in things that you
used to enjoy?

10.

Feeling distant or cut off from
other people?

11.

Feeling emotionally numb or being
unable to have loving feelings for
those close to you?

12.

Feeling as if your future will
somehow be cut short?

13.

Trouble falling or staying asleep?

14.

Feeling irritable or having angry
outbursts?

15.

Having difficulty concentrating?

16.

Being “super alert” or watchful
on guard?

17.

Feeling jumpy or easily startled?

This is a Government document in the public domain.
Weathers, F., Litz, B., Herman, D., Huska, J., & Keane, T. (October 1993). The PTSD Checklist (PCL):
Reliability, Validity, and Diagnostic Utility. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International
Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, San Antonio, TX.
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Appendix D
IAPS Slide Information: Slide Numbers, Descriptions and Normative Sample Valence
and Arousal Means
Slide No.
3000
3010
3030
3051
3053
3060
3061
3062
3063
3064
3068
3069
3080
3100
3102
3110
3120
3130
3140
3150
3168
3225
9252
9253

Picture Description
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Burn Victim
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Burn Victim
Burn Victim
Burn Victim
Dead Body
Mutilation
Dead Body
Mutilation
Mutilation
Mutilation
Dead Body
Mutilation

Valence Mean (SD)
1.59(1.35)
1.79(1.28)
1.91(1.56)
2.30(1.86)
1.31(0.97)
1.79(1.56)
2.32(1.61)
1.87(1.31)
1.49(0.96)
1.45(0.97)
1.80(1.56)
1.70(1.41)
1.48(0.95)
1.60(1.07)
1.40(1.14)
1.79(1.30)
1.56(1.09)
1.58(1.24)
1.83(1.17)
2.26(1.57)
1.56(1.06)
1.82(1.22)
1.98(1.59)
2.00(1.19)

Arousal Mean (SD)
7.34(2.27)
7.26(1.86)
6.76(2.10)
5.62(2.45)
6.91(2.57)
7.12(2.09)
5.28(2.60)
5.78(2.57)
6.35(2.60)
6.41(2.62)
6.77(2.49)
7.03(2.41)
7.22(1.97)
6.49(2.23)
6.58(2.69)
6.70(2.16)
6.84(2.36)
6.97(2.07)
6.36(1.97)
6.55(2.20)
6.00(2.46)
5.95(2.46)
6.64(2.33)
5.53(2.40)

The information presented above is taken from the IAPS instruction manual by Lang,
Bradley, and Cuthbert (2005). Normative ratings on the IAPS were collected over a
period of 13 years in large samples of undergraduate students.
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Appendix E
Further Exploration of PHLMS Data
The PHLMS (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a selfreport mindfulness measure assessing two factors: Present-Moment Awareness (PMA)
and Nonjudgmental Acceptance (NA). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (0=never;
4=very often) according to the frequency that the item was experienced within the past
week. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses support the two-factor structure of
awareness and acceptance and good internal consistency was demonstrated in both
clinical (Cronbach’s α=0.75) and nonclinical (awareness: Cronbach’s α=0.75,
acceptance: .82) samples (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). While good convergent and divergent
validity has been found for the PHLMS thus far (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), less validity
research has been conducted than on such measures as the MAAS due to its more recent
development.
With less validity research in comparison to the MAAS, the PHLMS was chosen
as a secondary measure of mindfulness for the current study. The rationale for its
inclusion was that if the PHLMS was found to be highly correlated with the MAAS, its
two-factor structure might provide interesting information about the levels of awareness
and acceptance in the current sample. In the final sample, the MAAS and the PHLMS
were found to be significantly but not strongly correlated, r (65) = 0.46, p <.01. As a
strong correlation was not found, the PHLMS was not utilized in further analyses of the
primary study hypotheses. The following analyses represent a further exploration of the
PHLMS data collected from the final sample.
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The mean PHLMS total score for the final sample was 36.52 (SD=5.10). As
previously mentioned, a benefit of the PHLMS is that it assesses two factors related to
mindfulness: Present-Moment Awareness (PMA) and Nonjudgmental Acceptance
(NJA). Participants in the final sample scored an average of 36.52 points on the PMA
subscale (SD=5.10) and an average of 30.87 points on the NJA scale (SD=7.14). These
scores are virtually identical to normative data reported by Cardaciotto and colleagues
(2008) in the initial PHLMS validation study, which utilized a college student sample
(PMA, M=36.65, SD=4.93; NJA, M=30.19, SD=5.84). No significant differences related
to participant gender were found for the PHLMS total score, or either of the two
subscales. No relationship was found between the two subscale, r(65) = 0.02, p=.87.
Therefore, the total score was not utilized in further analyses, and the subscale scores
were used separately to reexamine the primary study hypotheses.
The primary study hypotheses were reanalyzed, utilizing PMA and NJA
separately as the measure of DM. The rationale for these analyses was that one of the
discrete mindfulness factors might mediate changes in cognitive, affective, and
physiological changes, whereas the single factor MAAS did not. As analyses related to
the main study hypotheses required participants to be divided into groups of either high
or low DM based on their scores on mindfulness measures, median splits were performed
on PHLMS subscale scores to create these groups
For the PMA subscale, a median split was performed to divide participants into
groups of either high or low DM based on their PMA subscale scores. The PMA median
of 36 was utilized to perform the median split. Those categorized as high scorers (N=31)
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became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers (N=36) became the low
DM group. There was a significant difference between the mean scores of these two
groups, t(65) = -9.80, p <.001. On average, participants categorized through the median
split as the high DM group received a PMA subscale score of 40.71 (SD=3.20), while the
mean PMA subscale score for the low DM group was 32.92 (SD=3.29). To test
Hypothesis 1, a 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was
conducted to examine group differences in pre- and post-stressor Ospan performance.
Test condition (i.e. pre- vs post-stressor) and DM/PMA category (i.e. high vs low) served
as grouping variables, with Ospan total recall scores served as the dependent variable. To
test Hypothesis 2, a 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was
conducted. Test condition (i.e. pre- or post-stressor) and DM category (i.e. high or low)
served as the grouping variables. NA scores served as the dependent variable. No
significant findings related to mediation resulted from the analyses of either of these two
hypotheses. The previously reported significant differences between pre- and poststressor Ospan scores and NA were maintained. Table 3 and Table 4 contain the relevant
data and are presented below.
Due to missing physiological data, a second median split was performed in order
to test for the third study hypothesis related to changes in HR. The remaining 49
participants with physiological data yielded a median of 36 on the PMA subscale. High
and low DM group mean scores were quite similar to the findings of the previous median
split for the final sample (High, M=40.67, SD=3.31; Low, M=33.48, SD=2.91), and the
two groups differed significantly in their scores, t(65) = -8.08, p<.01. A 2 (Test
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condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine group
differences in pre- and stressor HR. Test condition (i.e. pre- vs stressor) and DM/PMA
category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping variables, with HR as the dependent
variable. No significant findings were produced. Data relevant to these analyses of
mindfulness and HR are presented in Table 5.
For the NJA subscale, the same median split procedure was performed, this time
utilizing the NJA subscale median of 32. Those categorized as high scorers (N=31;
M=31.17, SD=0.95) became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers
(N=36; M=30.52, SD=8.69) became the low DM group. There was no significant
difference between the mean scores of these two groups, t(65) = 0.37, p =.71. As no
significant difference occurred between these two groups, they were not used in further
analysis of the primary study hypotheses.
Table 3
Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for Ospan Scores
Df
F
Mean Square
(A) Test
1
10.68
65.94
Condition
(B) DM
1
1.31
43.07
AxB
1
2.79
16.94
(interaction)
Error (within
64
groups)
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P
<.01
.26
.10

Table 4
Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for PANAS NA
Df
F
Mean Square
(A) Test
1
12.98
133.83
Condition
(B) DM
1
0.12
2.43
AxB
1
1.10
11.35
(interaction)
Error (within
64
groups)

P
<.01
.75
.29

Table 5
Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for HR
Df
F
Mean Square
(A) Test
1
12.98
133.83
Condition
(B) DM
1
0.12
2.43
AxB
1
1.10
11.35
(interaction)
Error (within
64
groups)
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P
<.01
.75
.29
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Supervisors: Stacy Gwynn, PhD, James Rodgers, PhD
 Conduct evidenced based individual therapy with veterans from
diverse backgrounds, including Prolonged Exposure Therapy and
Cognitive Processing Therapy
 Conduct evidenced based group therapy with veterans from diverse
backgrounds, including Cognitive Processing Therapy
 Conduct diagnostic interviews for veterans seeking treatment from
the PCT for combat-related PTSD
40 hours per week
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10/2010 – 5/2013
Psychological Services Center
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Clinician
Supervisors: Paul Salmon, PhD, David Winsch, PhD, Bernadette Walter,
PhD, Janet Woodruff-Borden, PhD
 Conduct individual therapy with clients from the surrounding
community with diverse ethnic, economic, and educational
backgrounds
 Treat a broad range of psychopathology with cognitive-behavioral,
acceptance-based, and mindfulness techniques
 Administered intellectual, psychological, and personality
assessments
 Completed integrated reports detailing conclusions drawn from
scores received during assessments
20 hours per week
07/2012 – 5/2013
Psychological Services Center
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Clinic Assistant
Supervisor: Bernadette Walter, PhD
 Work 5 hour shifts at the clinic front desk, which include
administrative duties such as accepting payment, entering intake
assessment data and interacting with clients in the waiting room
 Conduct phone intakes of prospective clients, schedule intake
appointments and provide referral sources
 Conduct intake assessments for potential therapy clients from the
surrounding community with diverse ethnic, economic, and
educational backgrounds
 Completed integrated reports drawn from semi-structured clinical
interview and self-report questionnaires administered during intake
assessment of prospective clients
 Organized the 2012-2013 PSC Colloquium Series comprised of
monthly lectures by mental health professionals from the
surrounding area
 Taught a 6 week clinical interviewing course to first year Clinical
Psychology graduate students
 Organized full day workshop on PTSD for mental health providers
in the Louisville community through the Center for Deployment
Psychology
 20 hours per week
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05/2012 – 5/2013
Fort Knox Department of Behavioral Health
Fort Knox, KY
Supervisor: Charles G. Thomas, PsyD
 Conducted individual therapy with male and female active duty US
Army soldiers and family members of diverse ethnicities and
backgrounds
 Observed and participated in hospital-return, fit-for-duty, and intake
evaluations
 Co-led therapy groups for US Army soldiers experiencing
deployment-related psychopathology and substance abuse-related
difficulties
 Worked with an interdisciplinary treatment team, including civilian
and US Army psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and
nurse practitioners
16 hours per week
05/2011 – 08/2011
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Louisville, KY
Supervisor: Marilyn Wagner, PhD
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological
assessment batteries for veterans of various generations,
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds
 Completed integrated reports detailing conclusions drawn from
cognitive and personality assessment measure
 Conducted feedback sessions with veterans and their family
members, outlining findings of the assessment and providing
recommendations based on these findings
16 hours per week
08/2011 – 12/2011
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Louisville, KY
Supervisor: Steve Bliss, PhD
 Conducted group therapy with residents and intensive outpatient
program members at the Louisville VAMC Substance Abuse
Treatment Clinic & Substance Abuse Residential Rehabilitation
Treatment Program
 Led a weekly one hour process group with veterans of various
generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds
 Co-led a weekly two hour process group containing both residents
and IOP members
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 Attended interdisciplinary treatment team meetings and assisted with
treatment planning for SAATRP residents
8 hours per week
12/2008 – 05/2010
Eastern Kentucky University Psychology Clinic
Richmond, KY
Clinician
Supervisors: Don Beal, PhD, Robert Brubaker, PhD, Theresa Botts, PhD,
and Dustin Wygant, PhD
 Completed over 60 hours of individual therapy with children and
adults using behavioral and cognitive-behavioral techniques
 Conducted intake interviews and administered intellectual,
psychological, and personality assessments
6 hours per week
01/2010 – 05/2010
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Louisville, KY
Masters Internship Student
Supervisors: Marilyn Wagner, PhD & Katie LeSauvage, PsyD
 Conducted individual and group therapy for veterans of various
generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds and
performed intake assessments
 Trained in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and co-led two
ACT groups for veterans struggling with depression
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological
assessment batteries
 Conducted clinical interviews with veterans of various generations,
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds
 Performed assessments for differential diagnosis of veterans of
various generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds
 Completed integrated reports detailing conclusions drawn from
scores received during their neuropsychological assessments
40 hours per week
08/2009 – 12/2009
CAFÉ Research Lab
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Practicum Student
Supervisor: L. Kevin Chapman, PhD
 Administered the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM IV
to adults and children, as well as multiple self-report measures of
anxiety and mood disorders
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 Scored and interpreted the Symptom Checklist-90, the
Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children, the Beck Youth
Inventories, and the Resiliency Scales for Children and
Adolescents
 Conducted statistical analysis of data collected from clinical
interviews and assessment results
20 hours per week
01/2009 – 05/2009
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Louisville, KY
Practicum Student
Supervisor: Jeanne Bennett, PsyD.
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological
assessment batteries within the Polytrauma Clinic
 Conducted clinical interviews with veterans of various generations,
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds
 Completed integrated reports for several patients detailing
conclusions drawn from scores received during their
neuropsychological assessments
16 hours per week
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